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Abstract
As wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been applied across a spectrum of
application domains, source location privacy (SLP) has emerged as a significant
issue, particularly in security-critical situations. In seminal work on SLP, several
protocols were proposed as viable approaches to address the issue of SLP. However,
most state-of-the-art approaches work under specific network assumptions. For
example, phantom routing, one of the most popular routing protocols for SLP,
assumes a single source. On the other hand, in practical scenarios for SLP, this
assumption is not realistic, as there will be multiple data sources. Other issues
of practical interest include network configurations. Thus, thesis addresses the
impact of these practical considerations on SLP. The first step is the evaluation
of phantom routing under various configurations, e.g., multiple sources and
network configurations. The results show that phantom routing does not scale to
handle multiple sources while providing high SLP at the expense of low messages
yield. Thus, an important issue arises as a result of this observation that the
need for a routing protocol that can handle multiple sources. As such, a novel
parametric routing protocol is proposed, called phantom walkabouts, for SLP
for multi-source WSNs. A large-scale experiments are conducted to evaluate
the efficiency of phantom walkabouts. The main observation is that phantom
walkabouts can provide high level of SLP at the expense of energy and/or data
yield. To deal with these trade-offs, a framework that allows reasoning about
trade-offs needs to develop. Thus, a decision theoretic methodology is proposed
that allows reasoning about these trade-offs. The results showcase the viability
of this methodology via several case studies.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The Internet is rapidly developing which gradually removes the digital barrier
between the Internet and the physical world [123]. In the near future, not only
the computing devices but objects such as cars or even people will be connected to
the Internet. These objects equipped with tiny processors and radio transceivers
known as sensor nodes or motes, can sense different attributes of the environment
and use radio signals to communicate among themselves. The wireless sensor
network (WSN) is one of such technologies and a vital component of the sensing
technology, dealing with vast amounts of information for further processing and
analysis [4]. WSNs have enabled the development of many novel applications [6],
including asset monitoring [5], target tracking [41] and environment control [101]
among others, with low level of intrusiveness. They are also expected to be
deployed in the safety and security-critical systems including military [10] and
medical services [97].
As WSNs have been applied across a spectrum of application domains, they
increase the complexity and challenges in both academia and industry, especially
on data security and privacy. Specifically, the problem of source location privacy
(SLP) has emerged as a significant issue, particularly in security-critical situations.
There is a need to provide SLP because it has been shown that a malicious
attacker can trace the monitored assets by eavesdropping messages in the WSNs.
In many situations, it is very important to hide the physical location of objects
which originally send messages. Mastering the above aspects with the awareness
of the different potential issues becomes one of the most critical research topics
in the further advance of WSNs.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Wireless Sensor Networks
1.1.1 Overview
WSNs are highly distributed systems consisting of a number of tiny devices,
known as sensor nodes or motes, that can sense physical phenomena and use
radio signals to communicate among themselves (see Figure 1.1). The device
responsible for generating data is called the source. There is another device called
the sink (or the base station): a powerful device that gathers and processes all the
information collected by the sensor nodes. The sink serves as an interface between
the sensor nodes and the users. Sensor nodes are fitted with a large variety of
physical sensors (e.g., temperature, pressure, humidity and radiation), for the
purpose of monitoring, tracking and controlling environments and assets. In fact,
WSNs have enabled the development of many novel applications in agriculture
and farming [81, 98], environmental monitoring [93, 101, 104], medical services
[27], and military applications [10].
Source nodes
BS
Cloud
Users
Sensor nodes
Figure 1.1: Demonstration of wireless sensor networks
1.1.2 Components of Nodes
The sensor nodes in WSNs normally consist of four essential components [5]:
the sensing unit, the processing unit, the transceiver and the power unit (see
Figure 1.2). The sensing unit consists of a series of physical sensors that
provides the node with the ability to sense different environmental conditions.
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The processing unit is composed of simple 32/64-bit microprocessors which
have limited computational capabilities (typically between 8 and 25 MHz) and
memory space (typically between 4 and 10 kB for RAM). The transceiver (or
radio interface) allows the sensor node to send and receive messages at a low data
rate (between 70 and 250 kB/s) usually in the 2.4 GHz unlicensed industrial,
scientific, and medical (ISM) radio band of the radio spectrum. Choosing between
one band or another depends on the application scenario. Communications in
higher frequency bands have a longer range but find it difficult to overcome
obstacles. Lastly, the power unit provides energy to all the other components to
ensure they operate well. The power unit usually uses two AA batteries (i.e.,
3V) as an energy supply, thus it is regarded as the most limiting component in
sensor nodes as they cannot be replaced or recharged (without other powers that
recycle energy) once the network has been deployed. In addition, sensor nodes
may be equipped with other optional components depending on the practical
scenarios, such as localisation systems (e.g., GPS chips), power scavengers (e.g.,
solar panels) and external flash memories.
Figure 1.2: The components of a sensor node [6]
1.1.3 Communication Methods
In WSNs, data reporting methods could be time-driven, query-driven, event-
driven, or hybrid of these methods [7]. An event-driven approach is the most
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usual one because of energy efficiency. In the event-driven model, a sensor
node starts reporting data to the sink immediately after an event has been
detected (e.g., a sudden change of environment). Instead of establishing a direct
communication link to the sink due to high transmission power consumption,
the source uses multi-hop communications to deliver data which are transmitted
through multiple intermediate nodes. If no events or transmission tasks are
detected, the node becomes inactive (sleep) mode to save energy.
To fulfil these multi-hop communications, there are two basic protocols
adopted to meet the demands of data transmission: flooding and single-path
routing (SPR). Flooding is the simple routing algorithm where the node forwards
data to all its neighbouring nodes except the one that sent it. The intermediate
nodes repeat the process until data visits all the nodes in the network. The
advantage of the flooding protocol is that it is very reliable due to massive data
redundancy. However, it is also very energy inefficient because all the nodes are
involved in transmitting data. On the contrary, the single-path routing protocol
is intended to minimise the number of relaying nodes used to reach the sink. In
the single-path routing, whenever a node has event data to transmit, it sends
the message to a neighbouring node which is closer to the sink than itself. This
operation is repeated for each of the nodes until the data is finally delivered
to the sink. Additionally, some sensor networks may take advantage of data-
aggregation protocols [46, 61, 67, 152] to further reduce network traffic on its
way to the sink. Data aggregation consists of a set of operations (e.g., counting,
average, maximum, minimum) that are performed at some intermediate points
of the network to combine data originating from different sources. Processing
data at intermediate nodes results in more energy-efficient data communication,
thereby increasing the overall lifetime of the network [123].
1.1.4 Protocol Stack
The protocol stack in WSNs has five layers: the physical layer, the data link layer,
the network layer, the transport layer and the application layer [5]. The physical
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layer addresses the needs of simple but robust modulation, transmission, and
receiving techniques. It is responsible for frequency selection, carrier frequency
generation, signal detection, signal processing and data encryption. The data link
layer is responsible for the multiplexing of data streams, data frame detection,
medium access control (MAC) and error control. It ensures reliable point-to-
point and point-to-multipoint connections in a communication network. The
network layer takes care of routing the data supplied by the transport layer. It
is responsible for specifying the assignment of addresses and how packets are
forwarded. The transport layer helps to maintain the flow of data if the sensor
networks application requires it. This layer is especially needed when the system
will be accessed through the Internet or other external networks. Depending on
the sensing tasks required, different types of application software can be built
and used on the application layer.
1.1.5 Standardisation
The standardisation has been become a key requirement for the development
of wireless sensor networks. The standards define the functions and protocols
necessary for sensor nodes in the sensor networks [99].
IEEE 802.15.4 Low Rate WPANs
IEEE 802.15.4 is the proposed standard for low rate wireless personal area
networks (LR-WPAN’s) [19, 58]. This standard is designed for wireless sensor
applications that require short-range communication and low power consumption.
IEEE 802.15.4 standard asks devices following the agreed physical and data-link
layer protocols. For instance, the physical layer supports 868/915 MHz low bands
and 2.4 GHz high bands; The MAC layer controls access to the radio channel
using the CSMA/CA mechanism. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard also allows the
formation of the star and peer-to-peer topology for communication between
network devices. In the star topology, the communication is performed between
network devices and a single central controller, called the PAN coordinator.
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A network device is either the initiation point or the termination point for
network communications. The PAN coordinator is in charge of managing all
the star PAN functionality. In the peer-to-peer topology, every network device
can communicate with any other within its communication range. The PAN
coordinator acts as the root in the network. The peer-to-peer topology allows
more complex network formations to be implemented such as ad hoc networks.
ZigBee
The ZigBee standard was publicly available in 2005 [92]. It defines the higher layer
(i.e., above network layer) communication protocols upon on the IEEE 802.15.4
standards for LR-PANs. On the physical and data link layer, ZigBee adopts
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for LR-WPANs. ZigBee also defines mesh, star
and cluster tree network topologies with data security features and application
profiles [99]. ZigBee meets the unique needs of sensors and control devices,
typically with low bandwidth, low latency and very low energy consumption for
long battery lives and for large device arrays.
6LoWPAN
IPv6-based low power wireless personal area networks (6LoWPAN) enables IPv6
packets communication over an IEEE 802.15.4 based network [107]. With the
benefit of the standard, low power devices can communicate directly with IP
devices using IP-based protocols. As the IPv6 packet size is much larger than
the frame size of IEEE 802.15.4, an adaptation layer, new packet format, and
address management are used in the 6LoWPAN standard. 6LoWPAN is designed
for applications with low data rate devices that require Internet communication.
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1.2 Source Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor
Networks
1.2.1 Classification of Privacy Issues
WSNs have earned acceptance, and extensive work has been done on their
development [28, 57]. However, privacy protection has received a lack of at-
tention, and it is necessary to consider and address all potential privacy risks
that may arise from the adoption of this technology. Threats to privacy in
WSNs can be considered along two dimensions, content privacy and context
privacy (see Figure 1.3) [85]. Content privacy threats relate to use of the content
of the messages broadcast by sensor nodes, such as gaining the ability to read an
encrypted message. Content privacy thus focuses on providing integrity, freshness,
non-repudiation and confidentiality of the messages exchanged in the WSN. In
particular, content privacy includes data aggregation privacy and query privacy.
Data aggregation is designed to substantially reduce the volume of traffic in the
WSN by fusing or compressing data in the intermediate sensor nodes. However,
if intermediate sensor nodes are compromised, an adversary may decrypt the
transmitted data, inject bogus data or tamper with raw data, thus compromising
the content privacy. There are serval techniques for privacy-preserving data
aggregation [59, 119, 158]. In addition, an adversary can also infer client interests
with enquire leak, causing query privacy. Anonymity techniques [20, 157] are
mainly used to address this privacy issue.
Privacy in WSNs
Sink PrivacySource Privacy
Content Privacy Context Privacy
Data Aggregation Privacy Query Privacy Location Privacy Temporal Privacy Other Privacy
Figure 1.3: Classification of privacy issues in the wireless sensor networks
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On the other hand, context privacy threats focus on the context in which
messages are broadcasted and how information can be observed or inferred by
attackers. Context privacy comprises of hiding the identity, location of nodes and
traffic flow in the WSN. Context is a multi-attribute concept that encompasses
the situational aspects of broadcasted messages, including environmental and
temporal information. Location privacy may arise for such special sensor nodes
such as the source [74, 105, 126, 144, 148] and the sink [32, 33, 72]. It is often
desirable for the source of sensed information to be kept private in the WSN. In
addition, temporal privacy concerns the time when sensitive data is created at
the source, collected by a sensor node and delivered to the sink [75]. This type
of privacy is also very important, because an adversary with knowledge of such
timing information may be able to pinpoint the location of the tracked target
without having the knowledge of data being transmitted in the WSN [75].
1.2.2 Why Provide Source Location Privacy?
For the location privacy, let us use a panda-hunter game [115] as an example.
In a WSN, a node that senses a panda (e.g., temperature changes) informs
the sink that a change has occurred by sending messages that travel through
intermediate nodes to the sink. Poachers attempt to identify the location of the
data source to find the panda. Poachers often with a local vision of network
communications can act in the following way to find the panda: They start
from any point of the network1 and move around. They are equipped with
devices capable of measuring the arrival angle of received signals, which can
estimate the location where the messages sent from. Then poachers move on
to the nodes and repeat the process until they reach the location of panda. As
the movement follows the path of communication, this is usually referred to as
traceback attack. Similar problems occur in other applications. For example,
in a military application, a soldier transmitting messages can unintentionally
1Usually adversaries are assumed to start from the sink, as they can observe any incoming
communication.
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disclose their location, even when encryption is used. Other real-world examples
include monitoring badgers [41] and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Technology
Report [1], both of which would likely benefit from context security measures. In
this thesis, the context this thesis focuses on protecting is that of source location.
Techniques that protect source location are said to provide source location
privacy (SLP). The SLP problem focuses on ensuring that the location of a source
node or asset can only be observed or inferred by those intended to observe or
decipher it [74]. SLP is important in many application domains, though it is of
utmost concern in security-critical situations. The importance of SLP is not in
the protection of hardware of itself, but the need to hide the presence of events
in the field. In each of these scenarios, it is important to ensure that an attacker
cannot find or deduce the location of the asset being monitored, whether it is
an endangered animal or a soldier. In the panda protection example, poachers
have the local view of the network, meaning that they can monitor a limited
range of messages transmitted. On the other hand, a more powerful adversary
called a global adversary who has a global view of the network uses its sniffers
to eavesdrop all communication. It has been shown that in a non-SLP protected
network, even a weak attacker such as a distributed eavesdropping attacker [71]
can backtrack along message paths through the network to find the source node
and capture the asset [74]. Thus, there is a need to develop SLP-aware routing
protocols.
1.2.3 Formalisation of Source Location Privacy Problem
The SLP problem was first formalised based on the panda-hunter game [74].
In the WSN, the purpose of the network is to monitor the source, while the
purpose of the routing strategy is two-fold, to deliver messages to the sink and
to enhance the location privacy of the asset in the presence of an adversarial
attacker following a movement strategy. This model is formalised containing
six-tuple (G,Sink, Src,P,A,MA), where:
• G = (V,E) defines the network graph where V represents the set of sensor
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nodes, and E is a set of communication links connecting two distinct nodes.
• Sink is the network sink, to which all communication in the sensor network
must ultimately be routed to. Typically there is only one sink in the WSN.
• Src is an asset (i.e., the source) that the sensor network monitors.
• P is the routing protocol employed by the sensors to protect the asset from
being acquired or tracked by the attacker A.
• A is the attacker, or hunter, who seeks to acquire or capture the asset Src
through a set of movement rules MA.
The following chapters will expand on this representation and explain aspects
of the panda-hunter game further in the literature. Section 2.1 will detail the
network model including G, Sink and Src. The threat model including A and
MA will be described in Section 2.2. The routing protocols P will be reviewed
in Section 2.3.
1.3 Problem Statement and Research Contribu-
tions
Privacy is a key issue in WSNs. Aimed at providing SLP, a number of techniques
have been proposed such as phantom routing using random walks [74, 140],
message delay [64], fake sources [69, 115] and others [31, 113, 124, 127]. Most
existing researchers mainly focus on proposing protocols to provide SLP but are
constrained by a lack of in-depth investigation of SLP in practical scenarios such
as multiple sources and different network configurations.
This thesis aims to handle the SLP issue with multiple sources and different
network configurations. The problem statement is: Could routing protocols
protect SLP under multiple sources and various network configura-
tions in the WSN? To address the SLP issue, the thesis investigates it in
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terms of routing protocols, parameterisations and trade-offs. Specifically, phan-
tom routing is evaluated under multiple sources and various configurations.
The results show some shortcomings of phantom routing such as low SLP with
multiple sources. Then a novel parametric routing protocol is proposed, called
phantom walkabouts, for SLP in WSNs. Phantom walkabouts provides high level
of SLP with multiple sources at the expense of data yield. Finally, a decision
theoretic methodology that allows reasoning about these trade-offs is proposed.
This thesis makes the following main contributions:
1. Assessing the performance of phantom routing on source loca-
tion privacy under practical scenarios
In seminal work on SLP, phantom routing was proposed as an approach to
addressing the issue. However, results presented in support of phantom
routing have not included considerations for practical scenarios, omitting
simulations and analyses with multiple sources and different network con-
figurations. These shortcomings above are addressed by conducting an
in-depth investigation of phantom routing under multiple sources and two
different network configurations. Simulations are conducted by varying
four parameters: (i) random walk length, (ii) source period, (iii) network
size and (iv) number of sources. The results demonstrate that previous
work in phantom routing does not provide a high level of SLP with multiple
sources and does not generalise well to different network configurations.
2. Developing phantom walkabouts to achieve high level of SLP
Because recent work has shown some limitations of phantom routing such as
poor performance with multiple sources, phantom walkabouts is proposed,
a novel and more general version of phantom routing, which performs routes
of variable lengths. Phantom walkabouts addresses several shortcomings
of phantom routing such as unexpected termination of the random walk
and poor SLP under a certain network configuration. Parameterisations
are varied in phantom walkabouts to analyse the impact on SLP and other
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performance attributes including receive ratio, messages sent and message
latency. Through extensive simulations, the results show the viability
of phantom walkabouts. For example, under certain parameterisations,
phantom walkabouts achieves extremely high SLP with acceptable decrease
in other attributes.
3. Developing a decision theoretic framework for selecting SLP-
aware routing protocols
Routing protocols such as phantom routing and phantom walkabouts have
been proposed that provide SLP, all of which provide a trade-off between
SLP and other performance attributes. Experiments have been conducted
to gauge the performance of the proposed protocols under different network
parameters such as network sizes. As there exists a plethora of protocols
which contain a set of possibly conflicting performance attributes, it is
difficult to select the SLP protocol that will provide the best trade-offs
across them for a given application with specific requirements. For ex-
ample, the phantom walkabouts provides high level of SLP at expense
of the receive ratio. However, the decrease of the receive ratio may be
not acceptable for some scenario such as military applications. Therefore,
a decision theoretic procedure is proposed for selecting the SLP-aware
routing protocol that achieves the best trade-offs for the applications and
network configurations. The results show the viability of the approach
through different case studies.
More detailed summaries of the contributions are given at the end of Chapter 3,
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews various topics
related to the thesis including system models, threat models, existing SLP-aware
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routing protocols with different techniques, other existing context privacy issues,
simulators and performance attributes.
Chapter 3 presents an in-depth investigation of the phantom routing proto-
col under practical scenarios. Phantom routing is implemented with multiple
sources and various network configurations and then assessed by conducting a
range of experiments.
Chapter 4 presents phantom walkabouts, a routing protocol that with
variable random walk lengths. Phantom walkabouts aims to lead an adversary
roaming around in the network, hence keeping the source location safe. Simu-
lations are conducted by varying parameterisations of short and long random
walks in phantom walkabouts, and the results will show better SLP performance
than phantom routing.
In Chapter 5, a methodology is proposed where routing protocols are first
profiled to capture their performance according to a desired set of attributes, and
then a decision theoretic procedure is used for selecting the most appropriate
SLP-aware routing protocol for the type of network and application under study.
The results demonstrate the viability of the approach through various case
studies.
Chapter 6 summarises the thesis and discusses further work.
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CHAPTER 2
Literature Review
As one aim of the thesis is to assess and develop SLP-aware routing protocols,
this chapter first reviews various system models and threat models used in such
protocols in Section 2.1 and Section 2.2. System models investigate the contents
including the sensor nodes, network configurations and the message structure.
For threat models, they focus on the capability of an adversary in WSNs. Under
the definition of system models and threat models, Section 2.3 then explores
some existing methodologies that solve the SLP problem. Some other aspects
of privacy issues in WSNs are also considered as complementary knowledge of
SLP in Section 2.4. Furthermore, Section 2.5 presents popular simulations and
testbeds used to test WSNs. Finally, performance attributes mostly used in
experiments are reviewed in Section 2.6.
2.1 System Models in Wireless Sensor Networks
To investigate the SLP problem, there is a need to specify and model wireless
sensor networks. To present a clear understanding of a network, the system
models are considered from three aspects: (i) sensor nodes, (ii) network and (iii)
the message structure.
2.1.1 Sensor Nodes Modelling
In much of the literature, nodes are randomly deployed in WSNs [25, 29, 42,
94, 122, 136, 138]. They collect data from the environment and send data to
the sink(s). Specifically, when an object appears at a location monitored by a
sensor node, the node becomes the source node and will send messages destined
for the sink. Any sensor can become a source node as long as it has something
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to report to the sink [72, 129]. When the object moves to a new location, it
may trigger another sensor node to send messages, and that node then becomes
the source [113, 141]. However, some authors assume that the source location
is stationary, i.e., the source does not move in the network [69, 70, 71]. All the
nodes have a limited radio range and nodes within the range can either send or
receive from each other [42, 64, 72, 96, 109, 113, 114]. Because of their limited
radio range, nodes send their data to the sink using multi-hop communication.
Some energy-efficient MAC protocols (e.g., IEEE 802.11) allow nodes to detect
packets while in idle mode [95, 108]. There is only one sink in the network [30, 76],
but it can be either static or mobile [72]. Some authors assume that the sink may
have other capabilities. For instance, the sink knows the network configuration
and is able to monitor the energy consumption and remaining battery power of
every node [141]. In the WSN, nodes know their location and have knowledge of
the location of their adjacent neighbouring nodes through GPS [3, 88, 127, 148].
On the other hand, some authors assume that nodes do not have GPS capability
as localisation services consume too much energy [15, 17, 69, 70, 71]. Instead,
the knowledge of their relative location can be obtained by broadcasting beacon
packets sent from the sink [72].
Nodes in the networks are not only classified into three categories: the source,
normal nodes and the sink [32, 59, 63, 69, 70]. Instead, there are some other
special types of nodes in the networks. Ekici et al. [42] assume that there are
a small number of verifier nodes, which have the responsibility of verifying the
location of sensor nodes and a small number of malicious nodes which possess the
same properties as regular sensor nodes. Another authors [43] assume a hybrid
wireless sensor network with anchor, trusted, and untrusted nodes. Trusted nodes
can utilise standard encryption algorithms to hide an anchor nodes’ positional
information where both anchor nodes and trusted nodes share required common
information. Untrusted nodes use the same radio hardware used by anchor nodes
and trusted nodes. Li et al. [86] assume there is another type of nodes called
data mules in the network. They are mobile agents, moving independently which
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do not communicate with each other. They perform random walk movements
on the grid, whereby each transition produces a move of equal probability to a
horizontally or vertically adjacent cell.
2.1.2 Network Modelling
Most authors presume that a WSN is composed of finite two-dimensional grids
(cells) [3, 17, 69, 71, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 127, 148]. In the grid network configuration,
Bradbury et al. [17] and Laikin et al. [82] consider the SourceCorner configuration
where the single source locates in the corner and the sink is in the centre. Jhumka
et al. [71] consider other configurations called the SinkCorner configuration and
the FurtherSinkCorner configuration. In the SinkCorner configuration, the sink is
at the corner of the grid, while the source is at the centre. The FurtherSinkCorner
configuration is similar to the SinkCorner configuration, except that the source
is slightly offset from the centre.
On the other hand, other authors presume a tree configuration that of a
topological tree rooted at the sink [34, 35, 149]. They also presuppose the sink
cannot be compromised and it has a secure mechanism. In a tree communication
model, the root is the sink receiving data from the leaf nodes which simply
act as routers. Besides, Wadaa et al. [136] and Yang et al. [150] assume that
a network is partitioned into a number of clusters through a training process.
In this configuration, a high-end device is deployed into each cluster, acting
as the cluster head. In contrast to sensor nodes, high-end cluster heads have
relatively higher computation capabilities, larger storage sizes, and longer radio
ranges. For the communication in the network, authors [87, 88, 89, 108] assume
bidirectional links only, meaning two nodes are considered neighbours if they
can hear each other and the whole network is fully connected through multi-hop
communications. However, authors [15, 17, 69, 70, 71] do not claim that links
are bidirectional, i.e., links may disappear intermittently.
Authors [69, 70, 134] formalise the network as an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where the set of vertices V represents the set of N wireless sensor nodes and
16
2. Literature Review
the set of edges E represents the set of links between the nodes. Two nodes
m ∈ V and m′ ∈ V are said to be 1-hop neighbours iff {m,m′} ∈ E, i.e., m and
m
′
are in each other’s communication range. The graph G = (V,E) defines the
topology of the network with network of size n× n = N .
2.1.3 Message Structure
For the scope of context privacy, most authors assume that the source encrypts
messages and messages are decrypted at the sink [30, 37, 64, 69, 73, 87, 88]. As
a consequence, the contents of messages will not leak out to prevent an adversary
decrypting or modifying the contents. The encryption procedure can be achieved
by using a shared secret key between the nodes and the sink. However, the
contents of key management [21, 38, 44, 146, 155] including key generation,
distribution and update are beyond the scope of the thesis.
Messages continue to be sent periodically for a certain period, and will stop
when the object leaves the sensor’s monitoring area [72, 113, 129, 141]. They
contain information both in the header and the payload. The header information
is used at every hop for the routing purpose and thus contain information about
the sender and recipient of the message. The payload contains the information
of the monitored object reported by the source. Figure 2.1 is an example of the
CC2420 packet header structure which can be explained as follows [2]: The PHR
contains frame length information; The FCF is the frame control field defined in
the IEEE 802.15.4 specifications and the CC2420 data sheet; The #seq is the
data sequence number, which is incremented for each packet sent by a particular
node. This is used in acknowledging that packet, and also filtering out duplicate
packets; The destination PAN ensures the network can sit side by side with
another TinyOS network and not interfere; The destination is the address of a
packet; The source is the local source ID; The 6LowPAN is the TinyOS network
ID for the 6LowPAN TinyOS Network layer; The AM type defines the type of a
packet.
In the network, all messages are transmitted in the same format and have the
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Figure 2.1: TinyOS 2.x header format [121]
same length [37, 64, 141] and Sheng and Li [128] only consider one-dimensional
data. Each message includes a unique ID where the source event is generated [17,
89, 137]. Therefore, normal nodes can understand whether the messages have
been received and the sink can determine the source node location based on the
ID.
2.2 Threat Models in Wireless Sensor Networks
This section provides an overview of adversarial capabilities that are listed in
several threat models considered in the literature. In particular, this section
reviews the threat models from four aspects of an adversary: (i) adversarial
behaviour, (ii) view of the network, (iii) resources strength and (iv) network
knowledge.
2.2.1 Adversarial Behaviour
An adversarial behaviour could be either active or passive. An active adversary
could use positive behaviour to interfere with traffic flow or communication
behaviours by injecting, modifying or blocking messages [60, 63, 64, 120, 124].
For instance, Shaikh et al. [124] describe how an active adversary uses traffic
analysis attacks to track an asset. Hong et al. [64] describe another active
adversary that is capable of compromising a node to block traffic and to monitor
traffic flow around nodes. He et al. [60] mention data pollution attack where
an adversary tampers with intermediate aggregation results to make the sink
receive the wrong aggregation results.
However in most cases, adversaries are considered as passive in the litera-
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Figure 2.2: The procedures of the hop-by-hop traceback attack
ture [3, 29, 40, 45, 65, 72, 109, 116, 127, 130, 151]. A passive adversary does not
actively influence the nodes or the traffic between nodes. Ozturk et al. [116] and
other authors [140, 148] describe a typical behaviour of a passive adversary as
follows. The adversary starts at the location of the sink and only eavesdrops on
the traffic flow between nodes instead of manually changing it. When discovering
an event of a message transmitted in its monitoring area, the adversary uses
an attack strategy that the adversary follows the traffic between the nodes and
traces back in reverse order until reaching the source. This trace strategy is called
a hop-by-hop traceback attack and described in Figure 2.2 and Algorithm 1.
The hop-by-hop traceback attack only monitors traffic flow in the network,
while some other attacks focus on other aspects of the network. Some more ad-
vanced attacks include rate monitoring attack [148], time correlation attack [148]
and timing analysis attack [102]. In the rate monitoring attack, the adversary
monitors nodes with a higher transmission rate, as intuitively these nodes are
probably close to the source or the sink. In the time correlation attack, the
adversary observes the correlation in transmission time between a node and its
neighbour to find the route that a message travels to the sink. Finally, the timing
analysis attack is used to monitor transmission patterns to discern sensitive
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Algorithm 1 A Passive Adversary Strategy: Hop-by-Hop Traceback Attack
1: procedure Hop-by-Hop Traceback Attack(sink, source, msg)
2: next location ← sink
3: while next location 6= source do
4: Listen(next location)
5: msg ← ReceiveMessage()
6: if IsNewMessage(msg) then
7: next location ← CalculateImmediateSender(msg)
8: MoveTo(next location)
9: end if
10: end while
11: end procedure
information, such as the structure of the network and traffic flow [64]. These
advanced attacks may require an adversary having the capability of monitoring
a larger part of the network [37].
2.2.2 View of the Network
There are two types of adversaries when it comes to their network perspectives:
the local and the global adversary. A local adversary has a local view of the
network [32, 124]. Eavesdropping can be achieved using signal detection devices
or other sniffers [65]. For simplicity, authors assume the adversary has a hearing
radius equal to the sensor transmission radius [72, 76, 151]. A local adversary
is sometimes not alone and might collaborate with others. Jhumka et al. [71]
describe a threat model that involves multiple local adversaries collaborating by
sharing information on the configuration and traffic in the WSN. Together these
collaborating adversaries are also regarded as having a multi-local view of the
network. Li and Ren [87] assume that there are some adversaries in the target
area.
On the other hand, a global adversary has a full view of the network [3, 37,
45, 105, 108, 111, 114, 135, 147]. The adversary often uses its own network with
sniffers to eavesdrop on all communications happening in the network. A global
adversary is more powerful than a local adversary due to more knowledge of
network configurations and traffic flow. Normally, SLP solutions that defend
against a local adversary cannot cope with a global adversary, whereas solutions
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designed against a global adversary can often deal with a local adversary [9].
2.2.3 Resources Strength
A threat model often describes the amount of resources an adversary has in
terms of energy source, memory, move speed and computational capability [36,
87, 124, 127, 132]. The energy source determines whether adversaries can travel
freely in the network. The adversary records data from messages tracking, so
they need memory for data storage. The move speed is often considered with a
passive adversary because passive adversaries often act when hearing message
transmitted. Computational power for an adversary is used to track messages
by calculating the directions of incoming messages or decrypting messages. In
the literature, an adversary is considered as mobile with an unlimited amount of
power [116]. Kamat et al. [74] define the adversary as device rich and resource
rich. Device rich adversaries have the ability to assess the strength of the signal
and determine the angle of arrival of a signal, for example by measuring the
difference in the receiving phase of each element of an antenna array [103].
Meanwhile, resource-rich adversaries can move at any rate and has an unlimited
amount of power. Besides, they also have a large of memory to store information
such as messages that have been received before and nodes they have previously
travelled. Jian et al. [72] also mention that an adversary has memory to remember
his path and performs backtracking.
It is often assumed that strong adversaries have the ability to decrypt the
contents of a message. However, in terms of context privacy, they do not have the
keys to decipher the messages they overhear, so an adversary cannot obtain the
contents of the message [65, 70, 86, 100, 134]. Therefore, some attack strategies
(e.g., clone attack [154]) related to cryptology will not be discussed further.
2.2.4 Network Knowledge
The network knowledge of the adversary varies in the literature. Kamat
et al. [74, 75] define an informed adversary who knows the location of the
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sink and algorithms used in the network to protect the panda. Wang et al.
and other authors [76, 110, 131, 140] also assume that the adversary knows the
location of the sink and starts tracking from it. However, Deng et al. [32] assume
that an adversary cannot see the sink visually in a large network. Jhumka
et al. [70] assume that the adversary knows (i) the location of the sink, (ii) the
network configuration and (iii) the routing algorithm. However, the attacker
does not know the number of assets being monitored, and the possible location
of the assets. An attacker also learns about the 1-hop neighbourhood of different
nodes, depending on its location within the network. Besides, the adversary
knows, not only the routing algorithm, but the protection strategy being used in
the network [72, 141].
2.3 SLP-Aware Routing Protocols in Wireless
Sensor Networks
The concept of the SLP problem was first introduced around 2004 [116] which
proposed the panda-hunter game where the poachers only used network traffic
flow to track a panda. Kamat et al. [74] formalise the SLP issue based on the
panda-hunter game. Since then, many techniques have been proposed to address
SLP. The solution spectrum ranges from simple solutions such as pure random
walk [116] to more sophisticated techniques, such as fake sources [17, 71] and
message delay [15, 64]. This section discusses two main categories of solutions:
random-walk based techniques and fake-source based techniques. Other types of
solutions that provide SLP in the literature are also reviewed. For each algorithm,
its theory, strength and weakness will be discussed as well.
2.3.1 Random-Walk Based Techniques
Ozturk et al. [115] use the random walk as a technique to provide SLP. In the
phantom routing scheme (PRS), there are two phases: (i) the random walk phase
which is a pure or directed random walk, meant to deliver the message to a
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of phantom routing scheme
phantom source after travelling hwalk hops, and (ii) a subsequent flooding meant
to deliver messages to the sink (see Figure 2.3). Ozturk et al. discuss the pure
random walk in the phantom routing in detail and claim that the phantom node
is within 20% of hwalk from the real source after hwalk hops (see Figure 2.4a).
Then Ozturk et al. propose the directed random walk that avoids random walks
cancelling each other out (see Figure 2.4b). Both sector-based directed random
walk and hop-based directed random walk could guarantee phantom sources
far away from the true source. Instead of using flooding for the second phase,
Ozturk et al. also use single path routing algorithms, such as shortest path
routing. The combination of the random walk together with single path routing
is often referred to as the phantom single-path routing scheme (PSRS). Both
PRS and PSRS has received a lot of attention in the literature. On the other
hand, this class of solutions is known to have weaknesses [89, 124, 138], ascribing
poor SLP performance to the directed random walk reusing the routing path and
exposing direction information. Zhang [156] introduces an improved algorithm of
a sector-based directed random walk called self-adjusting directed random walk
(SADRW). Instead of dividing neighbours into two sets in the phantom routing,
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(a) Pure Random Walk (b) Directed Random Walk
Figure 2.4: Illustration of pure random walk and directed random walk
in SADRW neighbours are divided into four different sets. Nodes randomly pick
a neighbour out of one of the four directional sets and send messages to it. If
an intermediate node receives the message and cannot forward it to the same
direction, then it chooses a new direction to forward the message to until the
message travels a total of hwalk hops. SADRW solves the weakness of a phantom
walk that may unexpectedly terminate before hwalk hops, hence increasing the
SLP level.
Wang et al. [140] introduce phantom routing with a locational angle (PRLA).
In PRLA, the random walk is based on the inclination angle between a node and
its neighbours towards the sink. PRLA works as follows. In the deployment stage,
every node calculates the inclination angle between itself and its neighbours.
Then, every node uses the inclination angle to calculate the forward probability
of each of its neighbours. The higher the inclination angle of a neighbour, the
higher the forward probability of that neighbour will be. The source sends
messages to neighbours by using the forward probability of the neighbours. After
the message travels hwalk hops or the last node is not able to forward the message
with the same inclination angle, the message is forwarded to the sink using a
single path routing strategy.
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Yao and Wen [151] provide another improvement by introducing the directed
random walk (DROW). In DROW, every node has the knowledge of its own
hop-distance to the sink and the hop-distance of its neighbours to the sink. Each
node chooses the neighbours with a lower hop-distance towards the sink than its
parent’s. When sending messages, the node randomly chooses one of its parents
as the next destination. Authors claim several advantages applying to DROW
such as routing diversity, long safety period 1 and energy efficiency. However,
Deng et al. [32] show that DROW does not defend against a time correlation
attack. Wang and Hsiang [139] mention that the direction information retrieved
from the packet headers helps the adversary to find the source of messages.
Xi et al. [144] introduce the greedy random walk (GROW). In the GROW,
one random walk starts from the sink and goes to a randomly chosen receptor-
node. The other random walk starts from the source and meets the first random
walk at the receptor-node. Then the receptor-node uses the path established by
the random walk from the sink to the receptor-node to route the packet from
the source to the sink. In addition, the authors use a different approach, by
recording neighbours in a bloom filter which informs the choice of the next node
to be used in the random walk. However, there is still scope to improve nodes
that are allocated to take part in the directed random walk. Yao and Wen [151]
point out that the random walk used in the GROW is inefficient at creating
a safe distance between the receptor-node and the source. Wang et al. [140]
state that the latency is unstable due to the usage of two random walks. Other
weakness can be found from [89, 122, 124].
An algorithm called randomly selected intermediary node (RRIN) is intro-
duced by Li et al. [88] as an improvement over PRS. Unlike PRS, RRIN does not
leak any directional information via its messages. A source node sends a message
to a chosen intermediate node, and the intermediate node sends the message to
the sink. The choice of the intermediate node must meet the following criteria:
the location of the intermediary node must be at least a minimum distance away
1The notion of safety period will be introduced in Section 2.6.
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from the source and be normally distributed within the rest of the network.
The authors claim that RRIN has the same latency and power consumption as
PRS, but a higher safety period. Then Li et al. propose a second version of
choosing intermediate nodes. Each node in the WSN has an equal probability
to be the intermediate node of any given source node. The second version of
RRIN consumes much more energy [89] and has a higher delay than PRS, but it
does provide an even better safety period.
There are other algorithms using random walk techniques to address the
SLP issue such as the random routing scheme (RRS) [96], location privacy
support scheme (LPSS) [76] and network mixing ring (NMR) [87]. As random
walk is one of the early techniques used to provide SLP, they could only defend
against a local adversary. In fact, some solutions in the literature have discussed
weaknesses, which shows that the random walk is not always effective. Therefore,
algorithms need to be developed to guard against a powerful adversary with a
global view.
2.3.2 Fake-Source Based Techniques
Algorithms utilise dummy messages sent by a fake source to provide SLP. Some
nodes are chosen as fake sources and periodically send dummy messages to
obfuscate the real traffic. In the early stages of this technique, Ozturk et al. [115]
introduce the concept of fake sources and propose a theoretical algorithm called
short-lived fake source routing (SLFSR). The solution works as follows. If a
node receives a real message, it generates a probability p to decide whether to
send a dummy message. If p is below a threshold P , then the node broadcasts
a dummy message to all its neighbours. SLFSR consumes more energy but it
could improve the safety period. However, both Kamat et al. [74] and Ozturk
et al. [115] state that only one fake source at the time for only one dummy packet
is not enough to distract an adversary.
Chen and Lou [23] provide two solutions called dynamic bidirectional tree
(DBT) and zigzag bidirectional tree (ZBT). They both use the fake-source
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technique to confuse attackers, in such ways that the attackers are not sure if
they are tracking real traffic from the source, or following dummy traffic. In
DBT, each node knows its distance to the sink and of its neighbours to the
sink. The source randomly sends messages to neighbours with a shorter or equal
hop-distance, which works similar to the first stage of phantom routing. Then
intermediary nodes use a probability p to randomly select a neighbour to create
a branch and forward dummy traffic for h hops. The second solution (ZBT)
makes messages walk zigzags in the network. Firstly the sink generates one
proxy sink with each of its sides. Then the source randomly selects a node as a
proxy source which is i hops away from itself. The real traffic is following the
route that messages are from the source, to the proxy source, to the proxy sink,
and finally to the sink.
Jhumka et al. [71] propose another algorithm. Jhumka et al. first prove the
fake sources selection problem to be NP-complete and the algorithm works as
follows. The source node sends a normal message to the sink. When the sink
receives it, it waits a short period and broadcasts 〈away〉 messages that floods
the network. When a 1-hop neighbour of the sink receives the 〈away〉 message
it becomes a temporary fake source (TFS) and broadcasts 〈fake〉 messages
for a period. Before the TFS becomes a normal node they broadcast 〈choose〉
messages. When a normal node receives the 〈choose〉 message it becomes a
permanent fake source (PFS) if the node believes itself to be the furthest node
in the network from the sink, otherwise it will become a TFS.
Bradbury et al. [17] improve the algorithm in [71] through the online esti-
mation of its parameters. As the consequence, the improved algorithm provides
a better SLP level than [71] without requiring prior network knowledge. Then
Bradbury et al. propose DynamicSPR which is an extended version of the dy-
namic fake source technique [17]. DynamicSPR optimises the way fake sources
are allocated, in such a way that fake sources perform a directed random walk
away from the sink. This algorithm reduces the number of fake sources present in
the network and also the number of messages the technique sends (thus reducing
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energy usage).
Many other algorithms have been proposed with state-of-the-art fake-source
techniques [69, 70, 102]. However, these algorithms based on the fake-source
techniques mentioned so far can only provide SLP against a local attacker. For
the scope of the global attacker, a global protection scheme called Periodic is
developed in which every node sends a message after a fixed period [105]. This
provides perfect protection against an attacker with a global view of the network.
The authors [105] create a model involving traces of source detection, which
is used to measure the privacy of those traces as well as the energy cost of
providing SLP. In addition, a different approach where statistical techniques are
used to show that their global protection scheme provides high level of SLP [126].
Nodes use slotted transmission and send a packet at each interval. If a node
does not have a real message to send at a slot, it sends a dummy message. This
approach does not provide perfect global SLP as [105] does, but instead provides
statistically strong SLP. Their model and solution aim to make the distribution
of message broadcasts from nodes indistinguishable from a certain statistical
distribution.
Other techniques consist of a hybrid between generating fake messages and
having messages modify their routing path. Tree-based diversionary routing [94]
imposes a tree structure on the network using fake sources at leaf nodes, with a
focus on using the minimal energy possible at nodes 1-hop from the sink node
to lengthen the networks lifetime. Similarly, fog or cloud techniques [36, 100]
have been proposed to provide SLP where a normal message is routed through a
group of nodes called a fog and then onwards to other fogs.
Perhaps the most significant disadvantage of the described fake-source based
techniques is the volume of messages broadcast to provide SLP. This leads
to increased energy consumption and an increased number of collisions, both
of which result in a decreased message receive ratio. Another issue is that
fake-source based techniques can perform poorly with multiple sources due to
collisions between fake messages [82]. This means that a trade-off between energy
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expenditure and privacy must be made [69], making dummy message schemes
challenging for many large-scale networks.
2.3.3 Other Techniques
Apart from random-walk based and fake-source based algorithms described
above, some algorithms are reviewed with other techniques.
Geographic Routing
Geographic routing algorithms use the physical position of the nodes to route
messages from the source to the sink through WSNs. Shaikh et al. [124] propose
identity, route and location privacy (IRL) to provide SLP. In IRL, every node
classifies its neighbours as trustworthy, uncertain or untrustworthy neighbours.
Messages are sent with priority to the trustworthy neighbours until they reach
the sink. The weakness of this algorithm is that it can introduce cycles leading to
high latency and a low receive ratio. Lightfoot et al. [90] introduce sink toroidal
region routing (STaR) that adopts the notion of a random intermediary node
to generate a path from the source to the sink. STaR is an improvement over
RRIN, but it has limitations such as the assumption of networks consisting of
small grids and message loss [90]. Both IRL and STaR provide SLP against a
local adversary.
Message Delay
Generally, the message delay changes the traffic flows or patterns by holding
incoming messages for a random time before forwarding them. As a consequence,
nodes alter the chronological order of the messages, making it hard for a local
adversary to track the traffic to the actual source. Hong et al. [64] introduce
probabilistic reshaping (PRESH) to counter timing analysis attacks. The source
sends messages directly towards the first intermediary node, and then randomly
delays the transmission for a small amount of time following an exponential
distribution. Meanwhile, there can be many other transmissions in a node’s
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neighbourhood during the delay period. Therefore, the adversary cannot tell
where the message came from, as there are too many other transmissions that
an adversary could hear. However, PRESH lacks of a routing algorithm [108].
Integer linear programming (ILP) routing [15] uses a delay strategy where nodes
group received messages together and delay message transmitted by the distance
of the sink to itself. As a consequence, the attacker cannot make as much
forward progress towards the source. The ILP routing algorithm can provide
near optimal SLP but causes high message latency [15].
Cyclic Entrapment
Algorithms in this category aim to confuse the adversary by shaping the traffic
between nodes in cyclic patterns. The adversary which tracks traffic between
the nodes will travel in circles without finding the actual source. The works
in [113] and [133] contribute to the notion of cyclic entrapment method (CEM)
and path extension method (PEM) respectively. CEM aims to trap the attacker
in a cycle instead of letting them find the source node whereas PEM draws
the attacker away using extended paths that broadcast fake messages. Another
solution information hiding in distributing environments (iHIDE) is propose
by Kazatzopoulos et al. [78]. In iHIDE, only bus nodes can activate the virtual
cyclic loop node and nodes do not use probabilistic forwarding, but use time to
live (TTL) counters and probability to regulate the ring traffic. Both of these
two solutions use loops, where messages are sent to confuse a local adversary.
Cross-Layer Routing
Nodes normally use the network layer to exchange messages that contain infor-
mation on sensed events. The solutions discussed thus far mostly concentrate
on activities at the network layer. Different from the solutions discussed so far,
underlying layers of the communication protocol stack could be used to provide
SLP in a different way. Rather than utilising the network layer to exchange
messages about events, authors [127] use control messages from the medium
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access control (MAC) layer as well. In the cross-layer solution (CLS), nodes use
the payload field of the beacon frames to exchange data [127]. The beacon frames
might go unnoticed if the adversary does not listen to them and only checks
the network layer for traffic. The weakness is that the beacon frame interval
causes too much latency. Kirton et al. [80] develop a TDMA MAC schedule
that can provide SLP. The 3-stage protocol works as follows. The algorithm
first generates a normal data aggregation schedule (DAS). Then, it searches for
a suitable location in the network where the attacker can be tricked for some
time. Finally, the trick is to reassign slots to some nodes to ensure that the
attacker takes a longer route towards the source, thus delaying it. Kirton et al.
claim that the simulation results show great improvement at the SLP level when
SLP-aware DAS is used with little messages overhead.
2.3.4 Summary of SLP-Aware Routing Protocols
So far previous sections have investigated many SLP-aware routing protocols with
different techniques. However, there has been no universal solution proposed to
deal with all types of adversaries. In general, the performance of SLP algorithms
depends on the assumed system model and threat model. table 2.1 lists all the
algorithms discussed above with specific techniques and threat models.
2.4 Other Context Privacy Issues
In the location privacy domain, some authors have investigated location privacy
problems except SLP [13, 22, 32]. For instance, in order to protect sink location
privacy from a powerful adversary with a global view, Chai et al. [22] propose the
k-anonymity algorithm so that at least k entities in the network are indistinguish-
able to the nodes around the sink with regard to communication statistics. Then
Chai et al. design a generic-algorithm-based quasi-optimal (GAQO) method and
an artificial potential-based quasi-optimal (APQO) method to obtain optimal
solutions. Chen and Lou [24] claim the location privacy of both the source
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Solution Technique
Adversarial
Behaviour
View of
Network
Knowledge Weakness
PRS
PSRS
[115] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Random walk stops
[89, 124, 138]
SADRW [156] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local NA NA
PRLA [140] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink NA
DROW [151] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Time correlation attack
[32, 139]
GROW [144] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local NA
Path repetition
[89, 122, 124, 140, 151]
RRIN [88] Random Walk
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Multi-local NA
Energy consumption
[89]
SLFSR [115] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Weak safety period
[74, 115]
DBT
ZBT
[23] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local The protocols NA
[71] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Fixed parameters
[17]
[17] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Energy consumption
[18]
DynamicSPR [18] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
No low power listening
[18]
Periodic [105] Fake Sources
Eavesdropping &
Traffic analysis
Global The topology NA
IRL [124]
Geographic
Routing
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
High latency
[124]
STaR [90]
Geographic
Routing
Compromise node
Traffic analysis
Local NA
High packet drop rate
[90]
PRESH [64] Delay
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local NA
No routing algorithm
[108]
ILP [15] Delay
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
Very high latency
[15]
CEM [113]
PEM [133]
Cyclic
Entrapment
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local NA NA
iHIDE [78]
Cyclic
Entrapment
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local The topology NA
CLS [127] Cross-layer
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink
High latency
[127]
[80] Cross-layer
Eavesdropping &
hop-by-hop traceback
Local Location of sink NA
Table 2.1: Summary of SLP-aware routing protocols
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and the sink becomes a critical issue in WSNs. Chen and Lou solve this issue
by proposing four schemes: forward random walk (FRW), bidirectional tree
(BT), dynamic bidirectional tree (DBT) and zigzag bidirectional tree (ZBT) to
protect end-to-end location privacy against a local eavesdropper by using fake
routes. Another solution proposed by [118] use a mechanism for preserving the
anonymity of sources and sinks against global eavesdroppers.
SLP is mostly defined as a part of context privacy [100]. In general, context
privacy often includes identity privacy, location privacy, timing privacy, and
route privacy. Identity privacy ensures that the identity of nodes remains hidden.
Location privacy focuses on the hidden location of a node. Timing privacy
ensures that the temporal relation is hidden between incoming and outgoing
traffic. Route privacy hides route flow in the network. Li et al. [85] provide a
slightly different taxonomy to describe context privacy. Li et al. mention SLP as
data source location privacy and divide context privacy between location privacy
and temporal privacy. Location privacy is then further divided into data source
location privacy and base station location privacy. Kamat et al. [75] discuss
temporal privacy, which hides timing information related to packet creation.
Shaikh et al. [124] define three elements of privacy required to achieve full
network level privacy: (i) node identity privacy, (ii) route privacy and (iii) data
privacy. More works are mentioned in [26, 31, 117].
Finally, the data-centric sensor network (DCS) is a specific solution in the
literature. There is a demand for efficient data dissemination techniques to find
relevant data, leading to the development of DCS. Data-centric WSNs normally
are not designed to provide SLP and use different hardware than normal WSNs.
However, saving data inside a network also creates security problems. Shao
et al. [125] propose a privacy-enhanced DCS network solution called pDCS which
offers different levels of data privacy based on different cryptographic keys for
data-centric sensor networks.
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2.5 Simulators and Testbeds
A variety of WSN simulators exist, many with different features. This section
covers a number of the simulators considered for the simulations performed in
this work.
2.5.1 TOSSIM
TinyOS is a flexible, embedded, component-based operating system and platform
for low-power wireless devices, such as those used in wireless sensor networks [84].
The design motivations of the TinyOS are to deal with: (i) limited resources,
(ii) reactive concurrency, (iii) flexibility and (iv) low power. These features are
supported because the OS is written in a C dialect called nesC [49] optimised
for the memory limits of sensor networks. TinyOS supports an event-driven
concurrency model based on split-phase interfaces, asynchronous events, and
deferred computation called tasks.
Codes written for TinyOS can be run in the TOSSIM simulator and also
on a variety of hardware. TOSSIM is a discrete event simulator capable of
accurately modelling sensor nodes and the modes of communications between
them. TOSSIM provides two noise traces to model the environment: (i) The
meyer-heavy noise sample collected from the Meyer library from Stanford and (ii)
the casino-lab noise sample collected from Colorado schools of mines. The main
difference is that meyer-heavy trace creates a very noisy environment whereas
casino-lab trace generates a more quiet environment [83]. Instead of compiling a
TinyOS application for a node, users can compile it into the TOSSIM framework,
which runs on a laptop. Thus, this allows users to debug, test and analyse
algorithms in a controlled and repeatable environment. However, TOSSIM has
several disadvantages: (i) TOSSIM only supports codes written for TinyOS, and
(ii) Only one hardware platform (MICAz) is supported.
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2.5.2 COOJA
COOJA is a novel simulator for the Contiki operating system [39] that enables
cross-level simulation: simultaneous simulation at many levels of the system.
COOJA combines low-level simulation of sensor node hardware and simulation
of high-level behaviour in a single simulation. COOJA is flexible and exten-
sible in that all levels of the system can be changed or replaced: sensor node
platforms, operating system software, radio transceivers, and radio transmission
models [112].
The simulator is implemented in Java, making the simulator easy to extend
for users, but allows sensor node software to be written in C by using the Java
native interface. Furthermore, the sensor node software can be run either as
compiled native code for the platform on which the simulator is run, or in a
sensor node emulator that emulates an actual sensor node at the hardware level.
It supports the MSP430 and ATmega CPUs in the form of support for the
TelosB (Sky) and MICAz motes.
Whilst COOJA has proved to be very useful there are some issues with it
that do not seem to have been resolved. There are issues with the compiler
for the TelosB motes22 (MSP-GCC 4.6.3) where instructions are generated for
the MSP430X CPU instead of the MSP430 CPU present. This is the default
compiler provided by TinyOS and also the Debian operating system. Updating
to a more recent version of the compiler introduced its own set of issues, so code
needs to be written to avoid the generating MSP430X instructions.
2.5.3 RIOT
RIOT is a small operating system for networked, memory-constrained systems
with a focus on low-power wireless Internet of Things (IoT) devices [11]. RIOT is
based on a microkernel architecture inherited from FireKernel [143]. In contrast
to other operating systems with similarly low memory usage (e.g., TinyOS
2https://github.com/contiki-os/mspsim/blob/47ae45/se/sics/mspsim/core/
MSP430Core.java#L455
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or Contiki), RIOT allows application programming with the programming
languages C++ and provides multiple network stacks such as IPv6, 6LoWPAN
and transmission control protocol (TCP). Advantages of the RIOT architecture
thus include: (i) high reliability and (ii) a developer-friendly API.
However, RIOT has no provided simulator. This means that cycle accurate
simulators like COOJA would need to be used to simulate code. This comes
with the same downsides as using Contiki with COOJA, the main one being the
low scalability and low simulation speed.
2.5.4 FlockLab
FlockLab is a wireless sensor network testbed developed and run by the Com-
puter Engineering and Networks Laboratory at the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich in Switzerland [91]. FlockLab combines the capability of
a logic analyser, power analyser, serial data logger, and programmable power
supply with network synchronisation and deep local storage adjacent to each
targetdistributed across the entire testbed.
FlockLab consists of several distributed target-observer pairs and a set of
servers. Observers are powerful platforms that can host up to four devices under
test, the targets, connected through relatively simple interface boards. They
connect to several backend servers responsible for coordinating their distributed
and synchronised operation, for processing and storing collected results, and
interacting with FlockLab users. FlockLab users can program the nodes using
different OS such as TinyOS and Contiki. However, FlockLab does not have
enough nodes, so many SLP-routing protocols requiring hundreds of nodes cannot
be tested on it. Besides, queued jobs in FlockLab cannot exceed 1 hour of queued
testbed time.
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2.6 Performance Attributes in Wireless Sensor
Networks
The Attribute (or metric) is the standard of measurement, and it varies with
the measured environment. Several attributes close to WSNs characteristics are
used to evaluate network performance.
Network Lifetime
As the energy source is generally limited, protocols in WSNs must be energy
efficient to maximise system lifetime. Network lifetime strongly depends on the
lifetimes of the single nodes that constitute the network, thus it can be measured
by generic parameters such as the time until half of the nodes die. It is also
calculated as the time until message loss rate exceeds a given threshold [8].
Energy Consumption
The energy consumption is the sum of used energy of all the nodes in the
network, where the used energy of a node is the sum of the energy used for
communication, including transmitting, receiving, and idling. Assuming each
transmission consumes an energy unit, the total energy consumption is equivalent
to the total number of packets transmitted in the network [24, 106].
Message Latency
The message latency is defined as the average amount of time between sending a
packet from the source, and the time for successfully receiving the message at the
destination. Measurement takes into account the queuing and the propagation
delay of the packets. Therefore, the latency measures time cost for the individual
message [48].
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Fault Tolerance
Sensors may fail due to surrounding physical conditions or when their energy
runs out. It may be impractical to replace existing sensors. In response, the
WSN must be fault-tolerant such that non-serious failures are hidden from the
application in a way that does not hinder it. Fault-tolerance may be achieved
through data replication, as in the SPIN protocol [145]. However data replication
itself requires energy, thus there is a trade-off between data replication and energy
efficiency.
Scalability
Scalability of a network allows more sensor nodes to be involved during network
design. WSN scalability needs to consider an integrated view of the hardware
and software. For hardware, scalability involves sensitivity and range of sensors,
communication bandwidth of the radio, and power consumption. The software
parts include the reliability of data transfer, data management and suitable
algorithms for analysing the data. The combined hardware and software issues
include trade-offs between on-board computations and wireless communication
between nodes [8].
Receive Ratio
It is a common attribute and defined as the average percentage of messages
sent by the source that arrive at the sink across multiple repeats. The sink may
receive the same messages multiple times due to the messages flooding. However,
the redundant messages will not be calculated by checking the ID of received
messages.
Message Latency
It is the average amount of time it takes a message to travel from the source to
the sink. The message latency is only calculated when a message is sent from a
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source and successfully delivered to the sink. If a message cannot be successfully
forwarded to the sink, the latency will not be counted instead of given infinite.
Messages Sent
It is the average number of total messages transmitted through all nodes per
second in the network. A very simple energy consumption model is used where
each transmission of a message by a node costs one unit of energy. This model
omit other energy consumption such as the energy consumption for nodes sleep or
wake-up schedules as nodes are all active in the simulations [17]. This attribute
approximates the energy costs of sending and receiving which are expensive
activities in WSNs [101].
Coverage
It is always advantageous to have the ability to deploy a network over a larger
physical area. Multi-hop communication techniques can extend the coverage
of the network, but increase the power consumption of the nodes, which may
decrease the network lifetime [77].
For the scope of SLP, there are extra attributes used to evaluate the level of
SLP.
Safety Period
The overall objective of any WSN-based SLP solution is to ensure that the asset
(at a given location) is never captured through information leaked by the WSN.
There are two observations [16, 68]: If the asset is static, then the attacker can
perform an exhaustive search of the network to find the asset. In this case, the
SLP problem becomes irrelevant. Specifically, if there exists no time bound on
the capture time, then an exhaustive search is a trivial solution, yet effective
solution. On the other hand, if the asset is mobile, then performing an exhaustive
search of the network is unsuitable, as the attacker may zoom in on a given
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location only to find out that the asset has moved. Thus, the SLP problem can
only be considered when it is time-bounded, capturing the maximum amount of
time there mobile asset will spend at a given location.
This notion of time bound has been termed as an attribute called the safety
period in the literature [74]. The higher the safety period is, the higher the
source location privacy level. However, using the safety period attribute means
that simulation runtime is unbounded and potentially very large.
Thus an alternative, but analogous, definition for the safety period was
used for each network size and network configuration: the safety period is
obtained when protectionless flooding is used as the routing protocol. The
protectionless flooding, as described by Ozturk et al. [115] works as follows:
a node broadcasts a packet to its neighbours, its neighbours then broadcast
the packet to their neighbours. This process continues until all nodes within
the WSN have received the packet. Flooding is used as it has been argued to
provide the least SLP level, hence any SLP improvement is due to the SLP-aware
technique [74]. The safety period is then obtained by increasing this value
to account for the attacker potentially making bad moves. This definition is
commensurate with [17, 69, 71, 134], but uses a different multiplicative factor
due to the difference in the type of SLP technique being used.
Capture Ratio
Capture ratio is defined as the number of experiments ending in the capture
of an attacker in the safety period divided by the total number of experiment
repeats for a specific parameter combination [69]. The lower the capture ratio
is, the higher the source location privacy level.
Capture Ratio =
number of experiments ending in a capture
total number of experiments
(2.1)
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Attacker Distance
It is the average attacker distance from the source recorded at the end of a run
of simulation [15, 18]. For example, in [15], the object of the SLP-aware routing
protocol is to maximise the attacker’s distance from the source, hence keeping
the source safe.
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CHAPTER 3
Assessing the Performance of Phantom Routing on Source
Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks
3.1 Introduction
As wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been applied across a spectrum of
application domains, the problem of source location privacy (SLP) has emerged
as a significant issue. In seminal work on SLP, phantom routing [115] was
proposed as an approach to address the issue. This protocol combines random
walk technique and messages flooding to attract the adversary to the wrong
location, hence keeping the source location safe. However, authors [89, 124, 138]
claim the weaknesses of phantom routing such as poor SLP and unexpected
termination of random walk. Apart from those shortcomings mentioned above,
the range of experiments conducted in phantom routing is restrictive in the
literature, such that little is known about the ability of phantom routing with
multiple sources and various network configurations. Therefore, results presented
in support of phantom routing have not included considerations for practical
scenarios.
To better understand the SLP issue in WSNs, this chapter implements
phantom routing and investigates shortcomings by conducting an in-depth
investigation of phantom routing under various scenarios. Specifically, this
chapter considers up to three sources and various network configurations. Besides,
four parameters are identified, namely (i) length of random walk, (ii) source
period, (iii) network size and (iv) number of sources, that impact the performance
of phantom routing. These parameters are varied to assess their impact as well as
a range of experiments are conducted to validate these findings, both individually
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and in combination, on phantom routing as a viable approach to the problem of
SLP. The results demonstrate that previous work in phantom routing does not
generalise well to multiple sources and different network configurations.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 presents the
reasons why the phantom routing is worth for assessment and the implementation
of phantom routing. Section 3.3 shows the problem statement and Section 3.4
presents the models assumed. Details of the experiments conducted are provided
in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 shows the procedure of phantom routing execution in
a safety period. Section 3.7 presents the results of these experiments. Section 3.8
concludes this chapter with a summary of contributions.
3.2 Phantom Routing
This section first explains the reasons why phantom routing is chosen for assess-
ment and details the implementation of phantom routing.
3.2.1 Why Phantom Routing?
The phantom routing is a popular and simple protocol to provide SLP. Many
similar routing protocols are proposed based on the idea of phantom routing [140,
156]. The reasons why the phantom routing is selected and assessed rather than
other random-walk based routing protocols are:
• Results presented in support of phantom routing are often single source,
thus have not included considerations for practical network configurations
and multiple sources, omitting simulations and analyses with larger network
sizes.
• As many other routing protocols are derived from phantom routing [140,
156], they all have very similar phases: the random walk phase and the
flooding phase. If the phantom routing has been proved that it can only
deal with one source, the deduction can be made that those protocols
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of neighbours division in phantom routing.
In a network size of 7×7, the number in a node indicates the distance between
the sink and the node.
similar to phantom routing also cannot deal with multiple sources, hence
avoiding investigate all random-walk based routing protocols.
3.2.2 Phantom Routing Implementation
Since phantom routing was first proposed in 2004, it attracted much attention [74,
115, 156]. In this chapter, the phantom routing is implemented with a hop-based
directed random walk [115]. Phantom routing uses Algorithm 2, Algorithm 3
and is described below:
Deployment Phase
At the initial stage, before the source sends normal messages, the sink acting as
a landmark node floods beacon messages through the network. The purpose is to
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Algorithm 2 Random Walk Phase in Phantom Routing
1: procedure Random Walk Phase(msg, s)
2: msg.Sdir ← ⊥
3: msg.Mdir ← ⊥
4: msg.hwalk ← s
5: msg.Sdir ← ChooseOneSet(msg)
6: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
7: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(msg.Sdir)
8: if IsReachSink(msg) = True ∨msg.Mdir = ⊥ then
9: msg.hwalk ← 0
10: break
11: end if
12: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
13: FORWARDMESSAGE(msg.Mdir)
14: end while
15: end procedure
make a node knows its neighbouring nodes and obtains the distance to the sink.
Based on the distance of a node to the sink, each node maintains two sets for
all its neighbours: CloserSinkSet contains all the neighbours whose hop counts
to the sink are smaller than or equal to the node’s hop count to the sink, and
FurtherSinkSet includes neighbours with a larger hop count to the sink. After
neighbour nodes are partitioned, the source randomly picks one of these two
sets and sends normal messages to one neighbour in the chosen set. An example
is shown in Figure 3.1. If CloserSinkSet is chosen, intermediate nodes always
forward messages to the nodes whose distance to the sink is smaller than itself.
In addition, Figure 3.1 shows approximately half nodes in the network can be
chosen into either CloserSinkSet or FurtherSinkSet. Furthermore, the rest
of nodes do not belong to either CloserSinkSet or FurtherSinkSet cannot be
selected as phantom nodes.
Random Walk Phase
During random walk phase, messages are always sent to the neighbour in the
chosen set. If a message is blocked (e.g., there is no neighbour in the chosen
set so messages cannot be forwarded) the random walk phase stops. In other
cases, when a message travels s hops (assuming random walk length is s), it has
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Algorithm 3 Flooding Phase in Phantom Routing
1: procedure Flooding phase(msg)
2: if msg.hwalk = 0 then
3: if IsReachSink(msg) = False then
4: Flooding(msg)
5: end if
6: end if
7: end procedure
finished the random walk phase.
Flooding Phase
When the random walk phase ends, if the message does not reach the sink, the
message then floods the network until it reaches the sink.
3.3 Problem Statement
The problem to be addressed in this chapter is the following: In a WSN, the
phantom routing protocol is used to deliver messages from the source to the sink.
When an attacker is initially located at the sink and starts receiving messages
sent by the source to the sink, an important problem is to assess the performance
attributes (i.e., capture ratio, receive ratio, message latency and messages sent)
of phantom routing under multiple sources and various network configurations.
Formally, the problem specification is shown in Figure 3.2.
3.4 Models
The system model and threat model used in the experiments are presented
following on from description in Chapter 2.
3.4.1 System Model
The system model is described from three aspects: (i) the sensor nodes presenting
the information and knowledge of a node, (ii) the network containing the network
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Given:
• A WSN topology G = (V,E) where V is a set of wireless sensor nodes
and E is a set of edges or links,
• A phantom routing protocol P,
• A distributed eavesdropper A that is located at the sink initially,
• A set of source locations L,
• A set of network configurations C and
• A safety period Psafety,
Objective:
• Assess the attributes performance of phantom routing over Psafety in
the presence of L sources using P in G, C and A.
Figure 3.2: Problem statement: Assessment of phantom routing under multiple
sources and various network configurations
deployment, and (iii) the message structure demonstrating the information
preserved in a message.
Sensor Nodes Modelling
The wireless sensor node is a small computing device with communication and
computation capabilities. There are multiple sources collecting data and only
one sink receiving data in the wireless sensor network. When a source detects
an event, it will route, in collaboration with other nodes, the message to the
sink. All the nodes are stationary, i.e., they do not move in the network. It is
assumed that all nodes have the same communication range. A node m that can
directly receive a message from a node n is called a neighbour of n and a node
will have knowledge of all of its neighbouring nodes. Each node has a unique
node ID. The nodes do not have GPS capability.
Network Modelling
The sensor network is assumed divided into cells where each pair of nodes can
communicate directly with each other. The link between node pairs may be
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unidirectional or bidirectional. A collection of nodes consist of the network
regarded as undirected graph G = (V,E), where V represents the set of N
wireless sensor nodes, and E is a set of links connecting two distinct nodes.
1-hop neighbours are defined as two nodes m ∈ V , n ∈ V and m,n ∈ E, i.e., m
and n are in each other’s communication range. The graph G = (V,E) defines
the configuration of the network. This thesis focuses on the grid-like network
configuration, i.e., network of size n× n = N .
In order to test the performance of phantom routing in practical scenarios,
up to three sources and different network configurations are considered. For
the network configurations, the SourceCorner configuration and the SinkCorner
configuration are chosen. The three sources positions and the network configura-
tions are shown in Figure 3.3. The reason why the sources are clustered together
is that the thesis envisions providing SLP for several assets grouping together.
Nodes are located 4.5 meters apart in the network.
(a) SinkCorner configuration with 1, 2, 3 sources
(b) SourceCorner configuration with 1, 2, 3 sources
Figure 3.3: Network configurations with multiple sources
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Message Structure
The message content is encrypted, thus it can only be read by the correct
node (e.g., the sink) and not by an attacker. A normal message contains such
information when routed in the network:
< id,Sdir,Mdir, hwalk, broadcast >
where id is the unique sequencing number of messages sent from the source.
Sdir is the random walk set (i.e., CloserSinkSet or FurtherSinkSet). Mdir is
the random walk direction. hwalk is the length of random walk. The value of
broadcast is a boolean type indicating the status of a message whether it is used
for broadcasting or not.
3.4.2 Threat Model
This section assumes a distributed eavesdropper which means that the only action
the attacker performs is eavesdropping, while its location, hence knowledge, is
distributed across the network, i.e., the attacker can move from one location to
another in the network. The adversary capabilities can be categorised into the
following four domains:
Adversary Behaviour
There is a passive adversary that initially starts at the sink since it is guaranteed
to detect the arrival of a message at that location. Wherever the attacker is
located, upon receiving (i.e., overhearing) the first new message at that location,
the attacker moves to the neighbour who relayed the message. The reason to
focus on the first new message is that the message has, with high probability,
travelled along the shortest path from the source to the sink. Thus, when the
attacker hears a new message, it makes a step towards the source. This process
can be repeated a number of times until the attacker reaches the source location,
whereby it captures the asset.
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View of the Network
The adversary only has a local view where it can eavesdrop a 1-hop neighbourhood
comprised of different nodes. This can be achieved with signal detection devices
or other sniffers. The reason why this thesis focuses on a distributed attacker
with small visibility of the network is that an attacker physically presenting
in the network is more likely to have a limited power. For attackers to gain
global visibility of the network they will need to expend significant resources.
For instance, attackers need to deploy their own WSN to monitor the WSN that
is monitoring the assets, or has long range directional antennas. However, either
of which costs too much. Therefore, this work focuses on a single attacker with
a local view of the network.
Resources Strength
The adversary has a large energy source, i.e., there is no need to assume an
infinite energy source but rather than the amount of energy required for the task
is much less than the amount of energy available. The attacker does not keep
track of historical information, i.e., it may revisit a node that it has previously
visited. Besides, the attacker has the ability to determine the source of a message
that it overhears through the use of a directional antenna and obtain the strength
of the signal using spectrum analysers. However, the attacker does not read the
messages it overhears, so cannot obtain the contents of a message.
Network Knowledge
The attacker does not know the locations of nodes. Specifically, the attacker may
know the configuration of the network but not the specific locations of nodes.
For example, the attacker may know that the configuration is a grid, but not
the placement of the nodes in the grid. The attacker also knows the location of
the sink (similar to the assumption made in seminal work by [74]).
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3.5 Experimental Setup
The TOSSIM (V2.1.2) simulation environment was used in all experiments [83].
An experiment is made from a single execution of the simulation environment
using a specified protocol configuration, network nodes and a safety period. An
experiment terminated when any source node had been captured by an attacker
during the safety period or the safety period had expired.
A square grid network layout of size n× n was used in all experiments, with
n ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks with 121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes respectively.
Node neighbourhoods were generated using ideal communication model , which
is a unit disk graph radio model (UDGM) where a perfectly reliable network link
exists between the edges of a node’s neighbours. The noise model was created
using the meyer-heavy noise sample file provided with TOSSIM1.
The time interval between two messages sent from the real sources is called
the source period. For example, the source period is 0.5 second when 2 messages
are sent from the source per second. The source period was normalised with
respect to the number of sources so that any configuration will have the same
overall source period. The source period was set to be either 0.25, 0.5, 1.0,
or 2.0 second(s) (i.e., 4, 2, 1, 0.5 messages are sent from sources per second
correspondingly). The random walk length is regarded as a few hops and normally
does not exceed the sink-source distance in phantom routing [74]. Therefore, the
experiments set the fixed short random walk to 2, 5 and 8 hops. At least 2000
repeats were performed for each combination of source location and parameters.
The different safety periods Psafety were calculated as the following, where
T T is the safety period for protectionless flooding and ψ is the safety factor. A
large safety factor results in a long safety period, meaning that the simulation
has excessive time to run. Therefore, a large safety factor is not reasonably
given for the simulation runtime, but normally set more than 1.0 (i.e., the safety
period is longer than the time taken of flooding).
The safety period was calculated with the safety factor 1.3 from Equation 3.1.
1The first 2500 lines of meyer-heavy.txt were used.
51
3. Assessing the Performance of Phantom Routing on Source Location Privacy in
Wireless Sensor Networks
The reason to choose the value 1.3 is because the safety period is longer than
the time taken of protectionless flooding. In fact other safety factor values were
also applied. The time taken T T for each network size when source period
was 1 second, for protectionless flooding is shown in Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and
Table 3.32. The tables show that for a larger network size an adversary needs
longer time to reach the source location due to the longer sink-source distance3.
Psafety = ψ × T T (3.1)
To evaluate the performance of routing protocols, four performance attributes
were used: (i) capture ratio, (ii) receive ratio, (iii) message latency and (iv)
messages sent, which were discussed in Section 2.6.
Network Size SinkCorner (1 source) SourceCorner (1 source)
11× 11 12.479 ± 2.440 12.826 ± 2.660
15× 15 17.574 ± 3.041 18.059 ± 3.401
21× 21 25.617 ± 4.102 25.813 ± 4.169
25× 25 30.855 ± 4.452 31.071 ± 4.634
Table 3.1: Time taken (seconds) of flooding for each network size with one source
Network Size SinkCorner (2 sources) SourceCorner (2 sources)
11× 11 16.319 ± 5.789 15.286 ± 5.794
15× 15 21.794 ± 6.421 20.609 ± 6.111
21× 21 29.846 ± 7.077 28.557 ± 6.615
25× 25 35.255 ± 7.354 33.894 ± 6.971
Table 3.2: Time taken (seconds) of flooding for each network size with two
sources
3.6 Demonstration of Simulation Procedure
Before exploring the impact of various parameters, this section explains the
mechanism of simulations in terms of message timings. An example shown
2The results are generated from 10000 repeats of protectionless flooding with meyer-heavy
noise model and ideal communication model.
3The results of sink-source distance are presented in the Appendix B.
52
3. Assessing the Performance of Phantom Routing on Source Location Privacy in
Wireless Sensor Networks
Network Size SinkCorner (3 sources) SourceCorner (3 sources)
11× 11 14.892 ± 3.951 14.478 ± 4.448
15× 15 20.527 ± 4.650 19.898 ± 4.960
21× 21 28.281 ± 5.267 28.140 ± 5.745
25× 25 33.815 ± 5.806 33.699 ± 6.459
Table 3.3: Time taken (seconds) of flooding for each network size with three
sources
in Figure 3.4 is a run of simulation with configurations of network size of 11×11,
the SourceCorner configuration, a safety period of 50 seconds, a source period of
1 second and a random walk length of 5 hops. Every node is associated with
the unique node ID starting with 0. There are three types of messages: away,
beacon and normal message. There are also three types of nodes in the network:
source, sink and normal nodes. The procedures are described as follows:
1. Initially nodes in the network randomly boot up in 1 second. Then the
sink floods away messages to inform the network of distance from each
node to the sink. Beacon messages are flooded by the sink a little bit after
away messages to help ensure the information spreads correctly.
2. As the source period is 1 second, messages are only sent during this initial
timing period of a second. In most cases, all the nodes are involved in
sending messages transmitted. However, In an abnormal case only a few
nodes are involved in transmission (e.g., at time 14.0 seconds). This is
because the message is lost due to unreliable links during the random walk
phase, thus no flooding messages are sent through the network.
Although the safety period is 50 seconds, the experiment terminates at 17.5
seconds, suggesting the adversary reaches the source location and catches the
source at 17.5 seconds.
3.7 Simulation Results
This section conducts experiments to examine the impact of varied random walk
lengths in Subsection 3.7.1, source periods in Subsection 3.7.2, network sizes
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Figure 3.4: Demonstration of messages sent in the safety period
in Subsection 3.7.3, and numbers of sources in Subsection 3.7.4. In addition,
results of other attributes are discussed in Subsection 3.7.5.
3.7.1 Results: Impact of Random Walk Length on SLP
The length of random walk is an important parameter that can be varied in
phantom routing. This section examines the relationship between the capture
ratio and the random walk length.
Intuition: The intuition behind this investigation is the following: Denote the
length of the random walk by h and denote the source period by r. If the number
of paths from a source to nodes in Ph is similar, then the expected number of
times nodes will hear a message is per unit time if 1
r|Ph| . Thus, the mean time
between two successive messages heard by an attacker is approximately r|Ph|.
Thus, the expected amount of time an attacker has to wait from reaching a
phantom node h hops away from the source until it reaches the source, denoted
by T¯c is given by:
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T¯c ≈
h∑
i=1
r|Pi| (3.2)
Therefore, the conjecture is: The higher h is, the longer the attacker will have to
wait to reach the source. This waiting time may then exceed the safety period,
meaning that the source is not captured in time, thus reducing the capture ratio.
Results: To address this conjecture, experiments were conducted for each
network size and network configuration. The length of the random walk was
varied to be either 2, 5, or 8 hops and the network size is 11×11 (i.e., 121 nodes).
From Figure 3.5, the following observations can be made:
1. In both network configurations, an increase in the length of the random walk
leads to a corresponding decrease in the capture ratio, thereby confirming
the conjecture.
2. The SourceCorner configuration yields better SLP level than the SinkCorner
configuration especially with long random walk length and multiple sources.
In both configurations the capture ratio is around 80% with random walk
length of 2 hops. However, in the SourceCorner configuration the capture
ratio is below 20% with random walk length of 8 hops.
To have a better insight into the impact of phantom walk length, the section
also investigates the receive ratio in such situations. The results are shown
in Figure 3.6, and the following observations are made:
1. With an increase of random walk length, the receive ratio in the SinkCorner
configuration performs better than the SourceCorner configuration. For
instance, in the SinkCorner configuration with three sources, the receive
ratio is 70%. However, in the SourceCorner configuration with three
sources, the receive ratio decreases to 50% (see Figure 3.6c).
2. The receive ratio is at the same level within different source periods.
Besides, receive ratio decreases with an increasing number of sources. This
can be explained by multiple sources causing collisions when more than
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.5: Impact of random walk length: Capture ratio with multiple sources
and network configurations
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one message arrives simultaneously at a node. This message collisions can
also explain why multiple sources yield a better SLP level than a single
source.
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Re
ce
iv
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 2  5  8
Re
ce
iv
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Walk Length
(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.6: Impact of random walk length: Receive ratio with multiple sources
and network configurations
3.7.2 Results: Impact of Source Period on SLP
In real-world scenarios, it is to be expected that different applications will have
different requirements with respect to how often messages are sent from the
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source. This section will present results under varying broadcast rates and
analyse the effect different source periods have on the provision of SLP.
Intuition: The intuition behind this investigation is the following: Denote the
set of nodes h hops away from the source by Sh, where h is the length of the
random walk, and denote the source period by r. If all the nodes in Sh can be
reached independently by a similar number of paths, then the expected number
of messages received by any node n ∈ Sh per unit time is approximately 1
r|Sh| .
Thus, if an attacker has reached the node n, the lower r is, the higher is the
likelihood that the attacker will hear a message at n, hence will move one hop
closer to the source. Applying this reasoning over h means that a lower r can
cause the attacker to capture the source before the safety period elapses. Thus,
the conjecture is: As the value of r increases it will result in a lower capture
ratio.
Results: To address this conjecture, experiments were conducted for each
network size and network configuration. The source period of the application
was varied such that the time cost of messages transmitted per message was
0.25, 0.5, 1.0 or 2.0 sent from a source in the network.
From Figure 3.5, it can be observed that, across all network sizes and
configurations, a decrease in the source period leads to a corresponding increase
in the capture ratio for one source, thereby confirming the conjecture. As more
messages are being sent in the same period of time, the attacker has a greater
number of chances to move towards the source in response to a message. There
are two observations regarding these results:
1. In the network configuration of one source, the lowest source period yields
the highest capture ratio.
2. In the case of three sources, the low capture ratio is achieved with low
source period in the SinkCorner configuration, while the high capture ratio
is achieved with high source period in the SourceCorner configuration.
These are due to the different network configurations and message collision.
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 11  15  21  25
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Network Size
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 11  15  21  25
Ca
pt
ur
e 
Ra
tio
 (%
)
Network Size
(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.7: Impact of network sizes: Capture ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 2 hops
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.8: Impact of network sizes: Receive ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 2 hops
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3.7.3 Results: Impact of Network Size on SLP
This section explores the impact of network size to see whether phantom routing
works efficiently with a larger network.
Intuition: The intuition behind this investigation is the following: Denote the
set of nodes h hops away from the source by Sh, where h is the length of the
random walk. Given a network size N and fulfil N2 > Sh, an attacker can be
attracted to Sh phantom nodes. Therefore, the conjecture is: As the fixed value
of h it will not result in any change of capture ratio.
Results: The network sizes were varied as 11, 15, 21, 25 and random walk
length h 2, 5 and 8 hops. Figure 3.7, Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.11 contain the
capture ratio results and Figure 3.8, Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.12 contain the
receive ratio results. The following observations can be made:
1. In the SinkCorner configuration, the SLP level does not change with
the network sizes with multiple sources (see Figure 3.7, Figure 3.9 and
Figure 3.11). For instance, the capture ratio remains at the level of 80%
with two sources in Figure 3.7b and 60% with three sources in Figure 3.9c.
2. The situation in the SourceCorner configuration is opposite to the SinkCorner
configuration, where the capture ratio decreases with the increase of net-
work sizes. The reason is due to low receive ratio in the SourceCorner
configuration. In the SourceCorner configuration, receive ratio is lower than
the SinkCorner configuration with multiple sources (e.g., see Figure 3.10b
and Figure 3.10c). The reason behind this case can be explained as follows:
In the SourceCorner configuration, source locates in the corner of the
network. In this case, messages are always forwarding towards the sink
(i.e., the FurtherSinkSet is void and only the CloserSinkSet is chosen).
Assuming there are Sh phantom nodes in SinkCorner configuration, only
half of Sh phantom nodes exist in SourceCorner configuration, thus causing
more message collisions in the SourceCorner configuration.
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.9: Impact of network sizes: Capture ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 5 hops
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.10: Impact of network sizes: Receive ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 5 hops
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.11: Impact of network sizes: Capture ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 8 hops
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.12: Impact of network sizes: Receive ratio with multiple sources and
network configurations when random walk length is 8 hops
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3.7.4 Results: Impact of Number of Sources on SLP
In real-world scenarios, for instance, in an animal monitoring scenario, pandas
equipped with sensors as sources are often grouping together. Therefore, there
is a need to analyse the impact of multiple sources in the network. This section
will present results under the different number of sources and analyse the effect
different network sizes have on the provision of SLP.
Intuition: The length of the random walk is denoted by h and the number
of phantom nodes with source number i by Shi . For multiple sources, three
sources have more phantom nodes than two sources and one source situations
(i.e., Sh3 > S
h
2 > S
h
1 ). It indicates that an adversary may be attracted to more
different phantom sources with multiple sources. On the other hand, if sources
are scattered over the network, the attacker may easier to capture the source
since it is trying to capture any one source rather than capturing all sources.
Therefore, the simulations need to be conducted for validation.
Results: The length of the random walk h was 5 hops and the source pe-
riods were 0.25, 0.5, 1.0 and 2.0 seconds. There are following observations
from Figure 3.13 and Figure 3.14:
1. For all source periods, the capture ratio slightly increases with multiple
sources in the SinkCorner configuration, whereas capture ratio decreases
in the SourceCorner configuration. Besides, the results also show that the
capture ratio varies for different network sizes.
2. In all configurations, in a small network size one source performs best SLP
(e.g., low capture ratio), but performs the worst SLP in a large network
size. On the other hand, for three sources, the SLP level is very poor in a
small network size but best in a large network size.
3. The receive ratio performs the same level with different network sizes in the
SinkCorner configuration. However, the receive ratio in the SourceCorner
configuration is worse than SinkCorner configuration and decrease with
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the increasing number of sources. The reasons have been explained in Sub-
section 3.7.3.
3.7.5 Results: Other Attributes Discussion
So far results presented in this chapter have observed the impact of (i) random
walk length, (ii) source period, (iii) network size and (iv) number of sources.
In this section, in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the results,
other two attributes are investigated. Message latency defines the time cost
of a message sent from the source to the sink. This attribute does not impact
the SLP level of phantom routing, because the latency is only calculated when
a message is successfully delivered to the sink from the source. On the other
hand, messages sent defines the average number of messages transmitted by all
nodes in the network per second. It impacts the SLP level due to the source
period and the receive ratio. For example, a high source period will imply a low
capture ratio because the attacker will overhear only a few messages and would
not be able to track the asset down. In a similar way, if a node does not receive
a normal message, it is not going to forward it, reducing the number of messages
sent4. The results in Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 were generated with random
walk length of 5 hops.
Message Latency
Intuitively, the random walk hop is denoted by h, sink-source distance by ∆ss
and transmission time cost between two nodes by α. When the CloserSinkSet
is chosen, messages are always forwarded to the sink, so the minimum message
latency is α×∆ss. On the other hand, when the FurtherSinkSet is selected,
messages are always forwarded far away from the sink in the random walk phase
and then flooded to the sink. The maximum message latency is α× (2h+ ∆ss).
4The attribute message sent is not the mutually preferentially independent attribute,
which will be further discussed in Section 5.4.
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(a) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 0.25
second
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(b) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 0.5
second
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(c) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 1.0
second
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(d) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 2.0
seconds
Figure 3.13: Impact of source numbers: Capture ratio with multiple network
sizes and source periods
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(a) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 0.25
second
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(b) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 0.5
second
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(c) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 1.0
second
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(d) Results of SinkCorner and SourceCorner configurations when source period is 2.0
seconds
Figure 3.14: Impact of source numbers: Receive ratio with multiple network
sizes and source periods
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Therefore, the message latency lat is in between:
lat ∈ [α×∆ss, α× (2h+ ∆ss)] (3.3)
As messages in the SourceCorner configuration are always sent towards the
sink, the conjecture is: The latency in the SourceCorner configuration is less
than the SinkCorner configuration. The observations from Figure 3.15 are:
• Message latency in the SinkCorner configuration is between 75 and 150
milliseconds while in the SourceCorner configuration the latency yields 50
to 125 milliseconds, which proves the conjecture.
• As phantom routing does not apply any delay technique, message latency
is not affected by different source periods and number of sources.
• Message latency increases with larger network sizes as the sink-source
distance increases.
Messages Sent
Many routing schemes are constrained by energy consumption, therefore it is
necessary to investigate this attribute. The conjecture is: Low source periods
and large network sizes yield high messages sent.
From Figure 3.16 such conclusions can be made: First, for a given network
size, nodes transmit more messages in a smaller source period, hence more energy
cost. Second, the energy cost increases with larger network sizes.
3.8 Summary
This chapter has investigated the performance of phantom routing, a well-known
algorithm that provides SLP in WSNs, under various network scenarios. The
chapter has considered multiple sources, various network configurations and four
application parameters: (i) the length of random walk, (ii) source period, (iii)
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.15: Message latency with multiple sources and network configurations
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(a) One Source: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(b) Two Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
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(c) Three Sources: SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration respectively
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
Figure 3.16: Messages sent with multiple sources and network configurations
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network size and (iv) number of sources. These parameters are varied to assess
their impact, both individually and in combination on phantom routing. The
results show that:
• An increase in the length of the random walk leads to a corresponding
increase in the SLP level.
• An decrease of source periods causes a decrease in the SLP level provided,
i.e., the capture ratio increases.
• The SLP level does not change subject to network sizes.
• An increasing number of sources also causes an increase of capture ratio.
• Receive ratio affects the performance of the SLP level.
The overarching results summarise the main findings in this chapter. Mean-
while, the shortcomings of phantom routing can be summarised as:
• Phantom routing preserves low SLP level with a short random walk.
• Phantom routing cannot provide a high level of SLP with larger network
sizes.
• Phantom routing cannot deal with multiple sources on SLP.
Thus, the main contributions of this chapter are to:
• Define the practical scenarios: multiple sources and different network
configurations.
• Identify four parameters that impact the performance of phantom routing.
• Derive expressions that capture the impact of the four identified parameters,
as well as conducting a range of experiments to validate these findings.
• Demonstrate that, under varied network conditions, the phantom routing
has bad performance, confirming an initial conjecture that phantom routing
works well under specific conditions but requires fine-tuning in order to
realise optimal performance.
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Overall, the results show that the SLP level of phantom routing can drop by
a high factor under some practical scenarios. The conclusion is that phantom
routing is not as effective as initially claimed, as it was previously evaluated
under a restricted set of circumstances and network configurations.
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CHAPTER 4
Phantom Walkabouts in Wireless Sensor Networks
4.1 Introduction
Phantom routing is a typical routing protocol that deals with the SLP issue
in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The benefit of phantom routing is that
it provides better SLP than the protectionless flooding protocol and causes
low messages overhead. However, Chapter 3 has shown the shortcomings of
phantom routing by conducting an in-depth investigation under various network
configurations. The results demonstrate that phantom routing is not effective
under practical scenarios. Therefore, there is a need to develop a new SLP-aware
routing protocol which achieves better performance than phantom routing.
This chapter presents the concept of phantom walkabouts, a routing protocol
that is designed to provide a better SLP with multiple sources than phantom
routing. Phantom walkabouts aims to lead an adversary roaming around in the
network, hence keeping the source location safe. Compared to phantom routing,
phantom walkabouts has the following features: first, each node in the network
has the probability of becoming a phantom node, while only a limited number of
nodes could become a phantom node in the phantom routing. Second, phantom
routes with variable random walk lengths are performed. Third, phantom
walkabouts provides the routing with biased random walk as a special case that
solves the weakness of long random walks in a certain network configuration.
Multiple sources and various network configurations are also considered in the
simulations. The results show that phantom walkabouts could provide high SLP
level with trade-offs for other attributes.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 presents moti-
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vations which leads to the development of phantom walkabouts. This section
analyses some cases to demonstrate why phantom routing cannot provide high
level of SLP. Section 4.3 presents the implementation of phantom walkabouts
and the difference between phantom routing and phantom walkabouts. Problem
statement is presented in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 lists the parameters used in
the experiments. Experimental evaluation is then presented in Section 4.6, and
some discussions about the approach are in Section 4.7. Finally, Section 4.8
summarises the work of phantom walkabouts.
4.2 Motivations of Phantom Walkabouts
The section first briefly reviews phantom routing from Chapter 3 and then
illustrates motivations for the development of phantom walkabouts by presenting
the weakness of short random walk.
4.2.1 Phantom Routing Review
Chapter 3 considered four parameters that effect phantom routing performance:
the length of random walk, source period, network size and the number of sources.
By conducting extensive experiments, the results show that (i) phantom routing
achieves poor SLP with small random walk hops, (ii) phantom routing cannot
provide a high level of SLP with large network sizes, and (iii) phantom routing
cannot deal with multiple sources.
Chapter 3 also considered the combined effect of some of these parameters
and claimed that phantom routing is not as effective as initially claimed especially
under a restricted set of circumstances and network configurations.
4.2.2 Motivations of Phantom Walkabouts
Since the focus in this thesis has been on SLP-aware routing protocols, the
capture ratio is considered to be the most important attribute. Figure 4.1 shows
a typical scenario during an execution of phantom routing where the source
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the message routing with short random walks
sends a message to a phantom node which lies somewhere between itself and the
sink. At the beginning, a source sends a message with a few random walk hops,
then the message reaches a phantom node after finishing random walk. When
the phantom node floods the message to the sink, the first movement of the
adversary is always towards the phantom node and source as well. Therefore,
routes with a short random walk do not lure the adversary far away from the
source. In a case when an adversary is close to the source, the random location
of the phantom node may pull an adversary away from the source after flooding
(see Figure 4.2). However, in most cases the source can be easily captured since
the attacker gets too close to the source.
In order to avoid the risk that the phantom node is positioned close to the
real source, it would be beneficial to make the attacker’s first movements away
from the source, as shown in Figure 4.3. To achieve this, a longer random walk
can be used, where the random walk length exceeds the sink-source distance.
As such, phantom walkabouts with a mix of short and long random walks will
achieve a higher level of SLP than phantom routing. The phantom walkabouts
parametrisation is denoted by PW (m,n), where m and n denote the number
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the message routing with short random walks when
an adversary is close to the source
Figure 4.3: Illustration of the message routing with long random walks
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of short and long random walk respectively to be performed in a cycle. For
example, PW (1, 1) denotes a repeating sequence of a short random walk followed
by a long random walk. Later, this chapter will investigate the performance of
phantom walkabouts with various parameterisations (i.e., PW (1, 0), PW (1, 1),
PW (1, 2) and PW (0, 1)).
4.3 Implementation of Phantom Walkabouts
This section proposes a novel SLP routing protocol, termed phantom walkabouts,
which is a more generic version of the phantom routing strategy that addresses
the impact caused by small random walks in phantom routing. Phantom
walkabouts is basically phantom routing with variable random walk lengths.
The results will show better SLP than phantom routing. This section explains
the rationale behind the protocol and algorithms for forming the random walk,
the biased random walk and the overall phantom walkabouts algorithm. The
differences between the phantom routing and phantom walkabouts are also
summarised in Table 4.2. Table 4.1 lists the most commonly used notations in
the implementation of phantom walkabouts.
Table 4.1: Commonly used notations
Notation Description
msg The normal message
Sdir The random walk set of a message
Mdir The random walk direction of a message
Bdir The biased random walk direction of a message
Pbiased The probability of biased random walk
T T The time taken (seconds) of protectionless flooding
Psafety The safety period (seconds)
Ms The message with the short random walk
Ml The message with the long random walk
∆ss The distance in hops between the sink and the source
hwalk The remaining hops of the random walk
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4.3.1 Random Walk in Phantom Walkabouts
In the random walk phase of phantom routing some exceptional situations have
never been considered. For example, not every node could become a phantom
node; badly choice of phantom nodes may reduce the SLP; the random walk
stops when next location of a message is void. Therefore, a new random walk
algorithm is introduced to deal with neighbour nodes division and exceptional
termination of random walks. The new random walk algorithm works for both
short and long random walks.
Figure 4.4: Illustration of neighbours division in phantom routing
Neighbour division in random walk phase
Different from phantom routing that each node’s neighbours are divided into
two sets, each node’s neighbours are now divided into four sets in different
directions. This division can be done as follows: A node in the network acts
as another landmark node. As shown that in phantom routing the sink divides
a node’s neighbours into two sets by flooding beacon messages, the landmark
80
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of neighbours division in phantom walkabouts
Figure 4.6: Illustration of the routing with random walk in phantom walkabouts
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Algorithm 4 Random Walk Phase in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure Random Walk Phase(msg, l)
2: msg.Sdir ← ⊥
3: msg.Mdir ← ⊥
4: msg.hwalk ← l
5: msg.Sdir ← ChooseOneSet(msg)
6: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
7: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(msg.Sdir)
8: if IsReachSink(msg) = True then
9: msg.hwalk ← 0
10: break
11: end if
12: if msg.Mdir = ⊥ then
13: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(CloserSinkSet)
14: end if
15: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
16: FORWARDMESSAGE(msg.Mdir)
17: end while
18: end procedure
node in phantom walkabouts also floods beacon messages to divide a node’s
neighbours into another two sets, thus achieving the neighbour division into
four sets1. In other words, totally two waves of beacon messages are flooded
by two selected landmark nodes. In general, neighbours can be divided more
than four sets depending on requirements 2. More sets indicate that messages
could be forwarded to different directions, hence luring the adversary to different
locations in the network. Of course, more work in the deployment phase will be
carried out in terms of more neighbour-division sets. In the implementation of
the new random walk algorithm, the corner node is chosen as a landmark node
(e.g., node located in the corner). Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 demonstrate the
difference between neighbours division. The benefit of the division is: Given a
SinkCorner configuration, in the random walk phase of phantom routing half of
the nodes in the network could be used as phantom nodes whereas almost all
the nodes could become phantom nodes in the new random walk algorithm.
1Observe that this does not restrict the network configuration to be a grid, but the nodes
can be partitioned into these four sets.
2Due to the case that nodes are not equipped with GPS, more landmark nodes need to be
selected to divide neighbours into multiple sets.
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Algorithm 5 Flooding Phase in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure Flooding phase(msg)
2: if msg.hwalk = 0 then
3: if IsReachSink(msg) = False then
4: Flooding(msg)
5: end if
6: end if
7: end procedure
Random walk termination handling in random walk phase
If a message is blocked during the random walk phase (e.g., messages reach
the borderline of the network), the random walk stops in the phantom routing.
However, in the new algorithm, a new direction will be chosen and assigned to
the CloserSinkSet. This procedure is demonstrated in Figure 4.6. In certain
extreme situations when CloserSinkSet is void, the random walk terminates and
the node becomes the phantom node. Because it is believed that the phantom
node is farthest from the real source and ensures the safety of the source node
that its location will be hard to track. When a message travels l hops (assuming
random walk length is l), it has finished the random walk phase.
Similar to phantom routing, if a message does not reach the sink, the flooding
phase will start once the random walk phase ends. The algorithms of these two
are shown in Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5.
4.3.2 Biased Random Walk Routing in Phantom Walka-
bouts
The routing with random walk, especially a long random walk ensures that
phantom nodes are far away from the real source. However, there is a weakness
that needs to be addressed for certain configurations. Specifically, consider
the SourceCorner configuration, messages will always be transmitted towards
the sink. Owing to the random nature of the walk, the random walk may “go
through” the sink. In this case, the attacker will notice the message and will
move towards the source, increasing the chance of a source capture. Figure 4.7
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shows the issue.
Figure 4.7: Illustration of bad random walks and biased random walks in the
SourceCorner configuration
To address this issue, a biased random walk is developed, for the specific
configuration so as to avoid the risk of a random walk close to the attacker. In
the biased random walk messages are not forwarded in the direction of the sink.
Instead, messages are transmitted by following borderline nodes to avoid being
captured in the random walk phase. The routing with biased random walk is
described as follows and shown in Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 5.
• The source first chooses a set out of four neighbour sets, and then assigns
a direction from the chosen set for a message. The chosen direction is
called the biased direction (Bdir). The message direction Mdir is always
following the Bdir.
• When a node receives a message, the random value r ∈ [0, 1] is gener-
ated. The fixed parameter Pbiased is set in the experiments to make sure
a message has a high probability of walking along the previous biased
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direction. Normally the value of Pbiased is set larger than 0.5 but less than
1. For instance, if Pbiased is set to 0.7, it indicates the message has a 70%
probability of being transmitted along the previous biased direction. The
node decides the message direction Mdir by the following equation:
Mdir(r,Pbiased,Sdir,Bdir) =

Bdir if r ∈ [0,Pbiased]
Sdir \ {Bdir} otherwise
(4.1)
• When the message direction is blocked, it indicates that the message
reaches the end of this direction. The message will choose a new biased
direction to continue the random walk until random walk finishes. If the
new biased random walk direction is empty again, the random walk phase
stops. Then the flooding phase starts.
There is one remaining issue: The source cannot recognise where the sink
is. In other words, the source does not know the network configuration thus it
does not know whether the biased random walk should be applied. This issue
is addressed as follows: In a grid network, three corner landmark nodes are
chosen to flood beacon messages in the deployment stage3. After three waves of
flooding, the distance between the sink to each landmark node is calculated and
sent to the source through flooding. In reality, the sink is not exactly located
in the centre of the network, so biased random walk is used for the network
configuration where the sink is located in the small centre area. Assuming that
three landmark nodes are n1, n2, n3 and distances between the sink and each
corresponding landmark node are ∆n1, ∆n2, ∆n3, the biased random walk is
used when the distance fulfils Equation 4.2, where ∆ is a small threshold for
defining the centre area in the network. The solution of how to determine the
network configuration is also explained graphically in Figure 4.8.
3The location and number of landmark nodes varies for different network configurations.
85
4. Phantom Walkabouts in Wireless Sensor Networks
Algorithm 6 Biased Random Walk in Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure Biased Random Walk(msg, l, Pbiased)
2: msg.Sdir ← ⊥
3: msg.Mdir ← ⊥
4: msg.Bdir ← ⊥
5: msg.hwalk ← l
6: msg.Sdir ← ChooseOneSet(msg)
7: while msg.hwalk 6= 0 do
8: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(msg.Sdir)
9: if msg.Bdir = ⊥ then
10: msg.Bdir ← msg.Mdir
11: end if
12: r ← GenerateRandomNumber(0, 1)
13: if IsReachSink(msg) = True then
14: msg.hwalk ← 0
15: break
16: end if
17: if r ≥ Pbiased then
18: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(msg.Sdir \msg.Bdir)
19: end if
20: if msg.Mdir = ⊥ then
21: msg.Mdir ← ChooseOneNeighbour(msg.Sdir)
22: msg.Bdir ← msg.Mdir
23: end if
24: msg.hwalk ← msg.hwalk − 1
25: ForwardMessage(msg.Mdir)
26: end while
27: end procedure
|∆n1 −∆n2|+|∆n1 −∆n3|+|∆n2 −∆n3|≤ ∆(∆ ∈ Z+) (4.2)
4.3.3 Phantom Walkabouts
This section formalises the phantom walkabouts technique, which extends the
phantom routing protocol by adopting variable lengths of phantom routing.
When the source routes a message M using phantom walkabouts, a decision is
needed regarding whether M goes on a short (Ms) or long (Ml) random walk
route. The sequencing of messages looks like as follows:
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
m
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
· · ·
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Figure 4.8: Illustration of how the source determines the network configuration
using landmark nodes. Landmark nodes notify ∆n1, ∆n2, ∆n3 to the source by
flooding. Then the source knows the network configuration through Equation 4.2.
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Therefore, phantom walkabouts consists of m messages on short random walks
and n messages on long random walks, before the cycle is repeated. For example,
the messages sequences in PW (1, 2) are as follows:
Ms︸︷︷︸
1
, Ml, Ml︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
, Ms︸︷︷︸
1
, Ml, Ml︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
, Ms︸︷︷︸
1
, · · ·
Phantom walkabouts adopts all the techniques described in Subsection 4.3.1,
Subsection 4.3.2 and Subsection 4.3.3. The phantom walkabouts algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Phantom Walkabouts
1: procedure Phantom Walkabouts(m, n, PW (m,n))
2: m′, n′ ← m,n
3: while True do
4: if m′ > 0 then
5: msg ← GenerateMessage() . The message contains short
random walk
6: Routing(msg)
7: m′ ← m′ − 1
8: else if m′ = 0 ∧ n′ > 0 then
9: msg ← GenerateMessage() . The message contains long
random walk
10: Routing(msg)
11: n′ ← n′ − 1
12: else
13: m′, n′ ← m,n
14: end if
15: end while
16: end procedure
4.3.4 Summary: Difference between Phantom Routing and
Phantom Walkabouts
Before introducing the theory of phantom walkabouts, the section briefly sum-
marises the difference between the phantom routing and phantom walkabouts
shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: The Difference between phantom routing and phantom walkabouts
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4.4 Problem Statement
The problem to be addressed is: In a WSN, phantom walkabouts is used to
deliver messages from the source(s) to the sink. When an attacker is initially
located at the sink and starts receiving messages sent by the source(s) to the
sink, an important problem is to analyse the impact on SLP and associated
performance attributes (i.e., capture ratio, receive ratio, latency and messages
sent) of phantom walkabouts under various parameterisations. Formally, the
problem specification is shown in Figure 4.9.
Given:
• A WSN topology G = (V,E) where V is a set of wireless sensor nodes
and E is a set of edges or links,
• A phantom walkabouts protocol PW (m,n) where a pair (m,n) for
short and long random walk lengths,
• A distributed eavesdropper A that is located at the sink initially,
• A set of source locations L,
• A set of network configurations C and
• A safety period Psafety,
Objective:
• Evaluate the attributes performance of PW (m,n) with various param-
eterisations of (m,n) over Psafety in the presence of L sources in G, C
and A.
Figure 4.9: Problem statement: Evaluation of phantom walkabouts with various
parameterisations
4.5 Experimental Setup
A square grid network layout of size n × n was used in all experiments, with
n ∈ {11, 15, 21, 25}, i.e., networks with 121, 225, 441 and 625 nodes respectively.
The node neighbourhoods were generated using an ideal radio model and the
noise model was created using the meyer-heavy noise sample file provided with
TOSSIM.
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The source period was set to be either 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, or 2.0 second(s) (i.e.,
4, 2, 1, 0.5 messages were sent from sources per second correspondingly). In
Subsection 4.3.2, the parameter Pbiased and ∆ are introduced to implement
biased random walks. The larger the value of Pbiased is, the greater chance that
the random walk follows the biased direction. The simulation set the value of
Pbiased to 0.9 and ∆ to 5 hops.
When choosing the length of the short and long random walks for phantom
walkabouts, a variety of parameter combinations were considered. The exper-
iments set the short random walk series S = {2, 3, . . . , 0.5 × ∆ss}, and long
random walk series L = {2 + ∆ss, . . . , 1.5×∆ss}, where ∆ss is the sink-source
distance. In the phantom walkabouts, short and long random walks were ran-
domly generated from S and L during simulation runtime. For the phantom
routing, the random walk length was fixed to 5 hops. The safety period was
calculated with the safety factor 1.3 from Equation 3.1.
4.6 Simulation Results
As explained earlier, a message with short random walk will initially direct the
attacker towards the source while a long random walk will direct the attacker
away from the source, thereby possibly increasing the SLP. This section seeks
to determine whether the hypotheses hold. In each graph from Figure 4.10 to
Figure 4.17, the first row shows the results of phantom routing, followed by
results of phantom walkabouts PW (m,n) by varying m and n. The results of
phantom routing are used as a baseline for comparison.
4.6.1 Baseline: Phantom Routing with Multiple Sources
The section first establishes the base case against which subsequent improve-
ments will be evaluated. In the previous work on phantom routing, the length
of the random walk has typically been small, less than the sink-source dis-
tance. Figure 4.10a to Figure 4.17a contain the results of phantom routing.
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Capture Ratio: The results of SLP are shown in Figure 4.10a and Figure 4.11a.
Two important observations are made:
• In the SinkCorner configuration, multiple sources have the same SLP. The
situation is opposite to the SourceCorner configuration, where the capture
ratio decreases with an increasing number of sources.
• For both SinkCorner and SourceCorner configuration, the SLP is not
subject to different source periods.
Receive Ratio: Figure 4.12a and Figure 4.13a contain the results.
• In the SinkCorner configuration, the receive ratio is at a high level (ap-
proximately 80%) and a low source period results in the lowest receive
ratio. With an increase in the number of sources, the receive ratio slightly
decreases (e.g., to 70% with 3 sources). This outcome is due to messages
collision.
• In the SourceCorner configuration, one source yields the highest receive
ratio. However, the receive ratio decreases to 60% with 3 sources, which is
worse than the SinkCorner configuration.
Messages Sent: From Figure 4.14a and Figure 4.15a, the number of messages
increases with increasing network sizes. It can also be observed that the number
of messages transmitted is different at various source periods. However, the
number of messages transmitted gets smaller with an increasing number of
sources. This is due to the fact that a lower receive ratio limits the number of
messages that can be transmitted.
Message Latency: In the SinkCorner configuration, the latency is between 75
and 150 milliseconds for 1, 2 and 3 sources. In addition, a low source period
causes the relatively low latency in the network. However, in the SourceCorner
configuration, the latency is between 50 to 125 milliseconds, which is lower than
the SinkCorner configuration. All the source periods generate the same level of
message latency.
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(a) Capture Ratio: phantom routing with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(b) Capture Ratio: PW(1,0) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(c) Capture Ratio: PW(1,1) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(d) Capture Ratio: PW(1,2) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(e) Capture Ratio: PW(0,1) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
1
Figure 4.10: SLP level of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SinkCorner configuration
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(a) Capture Ratio: phantom routing with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(b) Capture Ratio: PW(1,0) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(c) Capture Ratio: PW(1,1) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(d) Capture Ratio: PW(1,2) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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(e) Capture Ratio: PW(0,1) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
Source Period 0.25
Source Period 0.5
Source Period 1.0
Source Period 2.0
1
Figure 4.11: SLP level of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SourceCorner configuration
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4.6.2 PW(1,0): SLP with Multiple Sources using Short
Random Walks
It has been shown that phantom routing does not provide a high SLP level with
small random walks. PW (1, 0) means only short random walks are adopted in
the network. The main differences between phantom routing and PW (1, 0) are
(i) neighbour nodes divisions and (ii) the randomised length of short random
walks in the random walk phase.
Capture Ratio: Figure 4.10b and Figure 4.11b contain the results of phantom
routing. Two important observations are made:
• In the SinkCorner configuration with 1 source, the SLP increases (i.e.,
capture ratio decreases) with decreasing source periods. This is intuitive
in the sense that the capture ratio can be expected to be higher as more
messages are sent by the nodes and can be captured by the attacker.
However, the SLP increases with an increasing source period with multiple
sources. The conjuncture is that a higher number of messages leads to a
much lower safety period, meaning that it is difficult for an attacker to
capture the source within the safety period.
• PW (1, 0) provides a better SLP than phantom routing in both configu-
rations with large network sizes. For instance, in the SinkCorner config-
uration with 25×25 network size and 3 sources, the capture ratio is 20%
in PW (1, 0) , while the capture ratio remains 60% in phantom routing.
Therefore, PW (1, 0) yields high SLP in a large network size rather than
a small network size. Besides, generally PW (1, 0) performs better in the
SourceCorner configuration than SinkCorner configuration.
Receive Ratio: As the different algorithm is used in the PW (1, 0), receive
ratio will also need to be investigated. From Figure 4.12b and Figure 4.13b, the
following results can be observed:
• PW (1, 0) and phantom routing have the same level of receive ratio in the
SinkCorner configuration. Another observation is that in the SourceCorner
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configuration the receive ratio of PW (1, 0) is better than the SinkCorner
configuration. For instance, the receive ratio is 60% in phantom routing
with 3 sources, while the receive ratio is over 80%. The reason is due to
the scatter of phantom nodes in PW (1, 0).
• For both configurations, the receive ratio decreases with an increase of
sources.
Messages Sent: From Figure 4.14b and Figure 4.15b, messages sent of PW (1, 0)
in both configurations are lower than phantom routing, especially in a low source
period. For instance, from Figure 4.14b, when the source period is 0.25 second in
the 25×25 network size, nodes transmit over 2000 messages in phantom routing,
whereas less than 1500 messages are transmitted in PW (1, 0). This happens due
to the unreliability of network links [12], causing a proportion of messages to
never reach the phantom nodes during the random walk phase. The messages
are thus not flooded, thereby reducing the expected number of messages being
sent.
Message Latency: The latency is very similar to phantom routing for both
configurations and different source periods, which indicates that PW (1, 0) will
not cause a high message latency.
4.6.3 PW(1,1): SLP with Multiple Sources using Alter-
nating Short and Long Random Walks
As has been shown, phantom routing and PW (1, 0) with random walk yields
lower SLP. To try and achieve a better SLP level, this section considers the case
where a short and a long random walk are chosen alternately, termed as phantom
walkabouts. The results are shown from Figure 4.10c to Figure 4.17c.
Capture Ratio: Alternating between a short and a long random walk in
phantom walkabouts, PW (1, 1) yields better SLP than phantom routing. Several
observations can be made from Figure 4.10c and Figure 4.11c:
• PW (1, 1) yields, in general, a much higher level of SLP than phantom
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(a) Receive Ratio: phantom routing with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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Figure 4.12: Receive ratio of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SinkCorner configuration
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Figure 4.13: Receive ratio of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SourceCorner configuration
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routing, especially for the larger-sized networks. The capture ratio reduces
at least 20% compared to phantom routing.
• PW (1, 0) in the SourceCorner configuration yields better SLP than the
SinkCorner configuration.
• In general, the network with 2 sources yields the worst SLP.
Receive Ratio: It has been shown that PW (1, 1) provides better SLP level
than phantom routing. In addition, there is a need to investigate the high
level of PW (1, 1) is due to the efficiency of phantom walkabouts or due to the
unreliability of the network.
• In the SinkCorner configuration, the receive ratio in a small network size
(e.g., the 11×11 network size) is 10% lower than in phantom routing. In
addition, receive ratio decreases with an increase in network size and the
number of sources. For instance, in the configuration of 25×25 network size
and 3 sources, the receive ratio is 50% compared to 60% in the PW (1, 0)
and 70% in the phantom routing.
• In the SourceCorner configuration with 1 source, the receive ratio is lower
than phantom routing. However, multiple sources yield better receive ratio
than phantom routing.
Messages Sent: The messages sent in PW (1, 1) is lower than both phantom
routing and PW (1, 0). The conjecture is that the low receive ratio causes
messages sent decreases.
Message Latency: The result that latency is higher than phantom routing
and PW (1, 0) is due to long random walks used in PW (1, 1), hence causing a
longer time cost from the source to the sink.
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Figure 4.14: Messages sent of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SinkCorner configuration
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(e) Messages sent: PW(0,1) with 1, 2 and 3 source nodes
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Figure 4.15: Messages sent of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SourceCorner configuration
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4.6.4 PW(1,2): SLP with Multiple Sources using Alter-
nating One Short and Two Long Random Walks
To further investigate the efficacy provided by phantom walkabouts, the new
routing mechanism consisted of messages being routed through a short random
walk followed by two long random walks. Subsequent routing then follows this
cycle. Owing to the two long random walks in phantom walkabouts, PW (1, 2)
produces better SLP.
Capture Ratio: It can be observed that this routing mechanism provided a big
improvement in capture ratio over the base case (Figure 4.10d and Figure 4.11d).
The capture ratio reduces at least 40% compared to phantom routing in the
SinkCorner configuration.
Receive Ratio: From Figure 4.12d and Figure 4.13d, although there is huge
improvement in the SLP over phantom routing, there is at least 10% reduction
in the receive ratio. Furthermore, the receive ratio decreases to 50% with 3
sources.
Messages Sent: In both configurations, the messages sent in PW (1, 2) is lower
than phantom routing. This reason is also due to the low receive ratio.
Message Latency: The latency increases from 20 to 30 milliseconds compared
to PW (1, 1) as extra one long random walk is used in the each repeat of phantom
walkabouts.
4.6.5 PW(0,1): SLP with Multiple Sources using Long
Random Walks
Finally, the section investigates the case that only long random walks exist
in phantom walkabouts (i.e., PW (0, 1)). From previous knowledge, PW (0, 1)
produces the best SLP but yields a poor receive ratio.
Capture Ratio: As can be observed from Figure 4.10e and Figure 4.11e, the
level of SLP provided with a longer random walk is much higher than phantom
routing, thereby corroborating the hypothesis. In both configurations, the
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Figure 4.16: Message latency of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SinkCorner configuration
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Figure 4.17: Message latency of protocols for 1, 2 and 3 sources respectively in
SourceCorner configuration
104
4. Phantom Walkabouts in Wireless Sensor Networks
capture ratio is no more than 10%.
Receive Ratio: On the other hand, though the capture ratio with long random
walks is much lower than with short random walks, the decrease in receive ratio
is around 20%, which is not nominal (see Figure 4.12e and Figure 4.13e). This
shows that phantom routing, with a long random walk, offers a much higher
level of SLP at the expense of decrease in the receive ratio.
Messages Sent: PW (0, 1) yields the lowest messages sent across all cases.
Again, the reason is due to the lowest receive ratio in PW (0, 1).
Message Latency: The latency in PW (0, 1) is between 100 and 250 millisec-
onds, which doubles in phantom routing as all routes are with the long random
walk.
4.7 Discussion
This section contains discussions about some issues and observations that arise
as a result of this work.
Flooding phase in phantom walkabouts
In the phantom walkabouts, flooding is used to deliver messages from the
phantom node to the sink. The reason to adopt flooding is simplicity. It requires
no costly topology maintenance or complex route discovery. However, it has
several shortcomings including implosion, overlap and energy consumption [62].
Therefore, the flooding protocol can be replaced by other enhanced protocols
such as gossiping [14] and sensor protocols for information via negotiation
(SPIN) [119]. However, the receive ratio in phantom walkabouts may decrease.
Besides, the safety period needs to be recalculated based on the corresponding
baseline protocol instead of baseline flooding.
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Performance of receive ratio
With long random walk in phantom walkabouts, the receive ratio is at a low level
due to the unreliability of network links [12], causing a proportion of messages
to never reach the phantom nodes during long random walks. Therefore, there is
a need to create a mechanism to provide high message delivery. Retransmission
is a solution to ensure reliability along the route. It works as follows: When a
message is transmitted from node J to a neighbour node K, K may send an
acknowledgement(ACK ) message when it has received the message from J . If
J does not receive any ACK message from K, it means that the message may
not have been successfully delivered to K. In this case, J will resend the same
message to K. Retransmission will stop when an ACK message is received or
the maximum number of retransmission have been sent. The implementation of
messages retransmitted is the next step for future research.
Trade-offs between SLP and other attributes
Phantom walkabouts provides a high level of SLP, but by reducing some at-
tributes performance such as receive ratio. Table 4.3 compares the performance
of four attributes between phantom routing and phantom walkabouts with the
SourceCorner configuration and network size 11×11. These results indicate
that there is trade-offs needed to be made between the capture ratio and other
attributes. To obtain a better capture ratio using this technique a decrease
in other attributes will be required. For many applications a decrease of this
magnitude will be acceptable. For example, protecting pandas will not be ad-
versely affected. But in some scenario where message latency or receive ratio
is important, such as on a battlefield or in healthcare, the selection of which
protocol must be thoroughly considered. Thus, the trade-offs should be made
under the consideration of such practical scenarios.
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Capture Ratio Receive Ratio Messages Latency
Phantom Routing 53.0%(-) 88.8%(-) 1854(-) 58(-)
PW (1, 0) 51.7%(-2.5%) 91.1%(+2.6%) 2478(+33.7%) 60(+3.4%)
PW (1, 1) 16.8%(-68.3%) 79.1%(-10.9%) 2342(+26.3%) 82(+41.3%)
PW (1, 2) 12.8%(-75.8%) 80.2%(-9.7%) 2338(+26.1%) 91(+56.9%)
PW (0, 1) 4.6%(-91.3%) 70.2%(-20.9%) 2113(+14.0%) 113(+94.8%)
Table 4.3: Comparison of attributes results under the given network configuration.
Phantom routing is used as a baseline.
4.8 Summary
This chapter first briefly reviews some shortcomings of phantom routing which
have been detailed in Chapter 3. For example, phantom routing cannot handle
multiple sources in SLP. Then a novel technique called phantom walkabouts
is proposed, which extends the phantom routing, to provide a better level of
SLP. Phantom walkabouts utilises sequences of short random walks and long
random walks to attempt to make the attacker move in the wrong direction,
as opposed to phantom routing (with small random walks) where an attacker
moves towards the source. The various parameterisations in phantom walkabouts
provide different levels of SLP. The main contributions of this chapter are to:
• Analyse the weakness of short random walk in phantom routing and
conjecture interleave sequences of short random walks and long random
walks could achieve a high level of SLP.
• Propose phantom walkabouts, a novel and more general technique than
phantom routing. phantom walkabouts solves several weaknesses of phan-
tom routing and helps achieve a better SLP with multiple sources and
different network configurations.
• Show the viability of phantom walkabouts through simulations. For ex-
ample, under certain parameterisations, phantom walkabouts achieves
extremely high SLP with acceptable decrease in other attributes.
The future plan is to investigate phantom walkabouts with dynamic short
and long random walks, i.e., in the current experiments, the values are fixed for
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short random walks and long random walks in one phantom walkabouts repeat.
However, this needs not be the case. In the dynamic phantom walkabouts,
the values of short random walks and long random walks in one phantom
walkabouts repeat can be decided by the routing protocol itself in the runtime.
Besides, the work has mostly focused on the SinkCorner and SourceCorner
configuration. Of course, the results in this chapter are only applicable to these
network configurations. Different phantom walkabouts may be necessary for
other network configurations. For example, a non-grid network configuration
may show very different SLP levels with PW (m,n).
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CHAPTER 5
A Decision Theoretic Framework for Selecting SLP-Aware
Routing Protocols
5.1 Introduction
A number of techniques have been proposed to provide SLP, such as phantom
routing using random walks [115, 156], message delay [15, 64], fake sources [17, 71]
and many others [78, 80, 124]. In general, the objective of SLP protection can be
informally stated as the provision of a high level of source location privacy while
expending as little energy as possible. Thus, the various techniques above navi-
gate this trade-off solution space. However, when several conflicting objectives
are involved, navigating this space becomes more challenging. For example, very
low level of message delivery yields high level of SLP (i.e., low capture ratio), but
such low level of receive ratio is intolerant in the WSN as the sink cannot receive
data from the source. Thus, this chapter proposes a methodology where routing
protocols are first profiled to capture their performance according to a desired set
of attributes. Then, a decision theoretic procedure is adopted for selecting the
most appropriate SLP routing algorithm for the type of network and application
under study. The results demonstrate the viability of the approach through
various case studies, and show how the suitability of different SLP protocols vary
according to the application under study.
In the Section 5.2, some SLP-aware routing protocols are reviewed, as well
as several protocols with minimal SLP by contrast. All these protocols will
be used to create a performance library. Section 5.3 and Section 5.4 present
a decision theoretic procedure for selecting the most appropriate SLP-aware
routing algorithm. Problem statement is presented in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6
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an example is given to demonstrate the execution of the decision theoretic proce-
dure. The adopted system and simulation approach are outlined in Section 5.7.
Section 5.8 presents three case studies to showcase the viability of the approach
taken. Section 5.9 concludes this chapter with a summary of contributions.
5.2 Routing Protocols Review
The section reviews the SLP-aware routing protocols that will be analysed in
this chapter. However, the framework can be extended to handle any other
SLP-aware routing protocol.
5.2.1 Protectionless Flooding and Protectionless CTP
Two routing algorithms that provide minimal SLP will be evaluated in this
work to compare against the SLP techniques. The first is flooding, in which a
source floods a message through the network by having each node that receives
it forward the message. Flooding is included as seminal work demonstrated that
the protocol provided minimal SLP [74]. The second is CTP [50] (the Collection
Tree Protocol) which uses the expected number of transmissions to gauge the
reliability of a link to form a routing tree from every node in the network to
the sink. CTP is included as it is a state-of-the-art reliable routing protocol for
WSNs. No work thus far has analysed its ability to provide SLP.
5.2.2 Phantom Routing
In seminal work [116], the authors proposed a solution called phantom routing,
which combines a random walk phase and a baseline flooding phase to provide
SLP level and reliable messages sent. The protocol works as follows: Each node
maintains two sets for all its neighbours where CloserSinkSet contains all the
neighbours whose hop counts are smaller than or equal to the nodes hop counts
and FurtherSinkSet includes neighbours with larger hop counts. After neighbour
nodes partition, source node(s) randomly pick either of two sets and send normal
110
5. A Decision Theoretic Framework for Selecting SLP-Aware Routing Protocols
messages to one neighbour in the chosen set. During the random walk phase, if
a message is blocked the random walk phase stops (e.g., there is no neighbour in
the chosen set, so messages cannot be forwarded). In other case, when a message
travels s hops (assuming random walk length is s), it has finished the random
walk phase. When the random walk phase ends, if the message does not reach
the sink node, the message is flooded throughout the network so that it reaches
the sink node.
5.2.3 Phantom Walkabouts
Phantom walkabouts is an algorithm using a random walk technique to provide
SLP [55]. This new technique, which uses a mix of short and long random
walks, achieves a higher level of SLP than phantom routing with a bounded
message overhead. The phantom walkabouts parameterisation is denoted by
PW (ms,ml), where ms and ml denote the number of short and long random
walks respectively to be performed in a cycle. When a source node routes a
message M using phantom walkabouts, a decision is needed regarding whether
M goes on a short or long random route. The sequencing of messages is as
follows:
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ms
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml
Ms, · · · ,Ms,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ms
Ml, · · · ,Ml,︸ ︷︷ ︸
ml
· · ·
For instance, PW (1, 1) denotes a repeating sequence of 1 short random walk
followed by 1 long random walk. Therefore, phantom walkabouts consists of ms
messages on the short random walk Ms and ml messages on the long random
walk Ml, before the cycle is repeated.
5.2.4 DynamicSPR
DynamicSPR is an extended version of the dynamic fake source technique [17]
in which fake sources are allocated away from the real source and sink in order
to provide a pull in that direction. This technique dynamically determines
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parameters online to be able to adjust to a changing network environment.
DynamicSPR [18] optimises the way fake sources are allocated, in such a way
that fake sources perform a directed random walk away from the sink. This
reduces the number of fake sources present in the network and also the number
of messages the technique sends (thus reducing energy usage).
5.2.5 ILP Routing
In ILP Routing [15], the problem of the SLP-aware routing of messages from
a source to a sink was modelled as an Integer Linear Programming (ILP)
optimisation problem. Using an ILP solver an optimal solution was obtained
when trying to maximise the attacker’s distance from the source. As the optimal
solution requires global knowledge, the authors implemented a distributed version
that had a message take a directed walk around the sink to approach it from
a direction other than the one the source was in. Messages were delayed by
different amounts so that they reached a similar point at a certain distance. By
doing this the attacker makes less progress, due to messages being grouped at
a similar location and because messages would be missed that take a different
path.
5.3 Decision Theoretic Procedure Overview
Given the number of SLP-aware routing protocols, each one optimising one or
more attributes, it becomes challenging to select a protocol for a given application.
For example, if an application requires a high level of privacy and is supposed to
run for a short time, selecting a protocol that trades-off privacy for lower energy
consumption will not be suitable. Thus, there is a need to develop a framework
that can guide a network or application designer in selecting the appropriate
SLP-aware routing protocol.
The section concerns about structuring the preferences to simplify the trade-
off analysis. As multi-attribute optimisation is concerned, this section provides
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Table 5.1: Commonly used symbols
Symbol Description
NC The network configuration
P The name of a given routing protocol
rNC,Pω The result of a attribute under NC and P
RNC,Pω The normalised result of a attribute under NC and P
rNC,P The result vector of all attributes under NC and P
RNC,P The performance vector of all attributes under NC and P
UNC,Pω The utility of a single attribute under NC and P
UNC,P The utility of performance vector under NC and P
ua The aspiration vector
λω The weight of a single attribute
∆ss The distance in hops between the sink and the source
T T The time taken (seconds) of protectionless flooding
Psafety The safety period (seconds)
a brief overview of the theory underpinning the generation of multi-attribute
utility functions. Table 5.1 summarises the most commonly used symbols in the
chapter.
5.3.1 Introduction to Decision Theory (DT)
Very often, real-world cases deal with multiple attributes. This chapter as-
sumes that the real-world cases have n evaluators, E1, E2, . . . En, evaluating
attributes a1, a2, . . . an respectively, such that (E1(a1), E2(a2), . . . En(an)) =
(q1, q2, . . . , qn), where each qi captures the “performance” of the protocol for a
particular attribute and the vector (q1, q2, . . . , qn) is the “performance” vector of
a protocol. An overall relevance function, G, may be expressed in additive form:
G(q1, q2, . . . , qn) =
n∑
i=1
(λi ∗Gi(qi)) (5.1)
where Gi’s are single-attribute or individual relevance functions [51, 79], and∑n
i=1 λi = 1 iff the attributes are mutually preferentially independent, i.e., trade-
off between pairs of attributes is independent of the values of other attributes.
Such a property is important to keep the selection “local”, i.e., the trade-offs
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between a pair of attributes need not consider the values of all other attributes.
A higher value of λi is indicative of the higher importance of a corresponding
attribute. Thus, to generate the overall relevance function, each λi needs to
be determined, subject to the constraint
∑n
i=1 λi = 1. Also, each individual
relevance function Gi needs to be generated by the system administrator or
application developer. Determining an accurate Gi is a challenging process. An
interested reader is directed to [51, 79] for more information about generating
such functions, which is beyond the objectives of this thesis. arbitrary functions
are used to showcase the decision theoretic methodology proposed.
5.3.2 Decision Theory-Based Heuristic
The section presents a novel two-step decision procedure (or heuristic) that
helps to choose the most suitable SLP-aware routing algorithm from a set of
contenders for a given application:
Step 1 - Profiling and Filtering
1. For various network configurations (size, safety factor, noise models etc.),
run all the protocols to obtain their respective performance profiles, i.e.,
to generate their performance vectors. This step can be done once and the
profiles are stored in a database or library.
2. Determine all decision attributes for the application (e.g., capture ratio,
receive ratio or message latency). If the attributes are not mutually
preferentially independent, at this point they are either transformed so
that they can satisfy this property or more sophisticated techniques are
required. Also, determine the network configuration which the application
will be running under. This is called the input network configuration
(or input configuration). If there is no profile associated with the input
configuration, then either the protocol has to be run under this new
configuration (and added to the library) or a profile exists in the library
for a configuration that is close enough to the input configuration.
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3. For a given input network configuration, determine a performance vec-
tor that best represents the application’s requirements, i.e., determine a
performance vector that captures the acceptable value boundary for each
attribute. The boundary is the maximal or minimal acceptable value,
depending on the attribute type. This vector is referred as the aspiration
vector.
4. For the given input network configuration, remove all vectors that are either
dominated by the aspiration vector since they fall short of the application’s
requirements for input configuration (i.e., all entries in the aspiration vector
are better than the corresponding ones in the vector under consideration).
5. If there are no candidates left, go to 3. Else, for each attribute, determine
the minimum and maximum values from the remaining alternatives. This
is done to help in determining normalised single-attribute functions (range
from 0 to 1).
Step 2 - Characterisation and Selection
1. Determine the (i) individual weights (or importance) of each attribute, (ii)
individual relevance function and (iii) the overall relevance function.
2. For each algorithm (i.e., performance vector) in the set of remaining
contenders, insert their attribute values in the overall relevance function
to obtain their respective relevance or utility values.
3. Select the alternative with the highest relevance value.
5.4 Decision Theoretic Procedure for Selecting
SLP-Aware Routing Protocols
This section imposes the decision theoretic framework on the protocols and now
explain the steps in more detail.
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5.4.1 Step 1: Profiling and Filtering SLP-Aware Routing
Algorithms
1. Profiling the Protocols
In the first phase of Step 1, the network administrator runs every protocol
under consideration under various network configurations. This step need not
be repeated for every application, but is a one-time activity. These profiles (or
protocol performance vectors) can then be saved or stored in a protocol library
that can be used whenever a new application is developed. If a new protocol is
developed, then the process is repeated for the new protocol, and its (normalised)
performance profile is added to the library.
2. Determining Decision Attributes
There are four decision attributes: (i) capture ratio (cr), (ii) receive ratio (rr),
(iii) message latency (lat) and (iv) messages sent (mSent). These four attributes
could be classified into gain type (high value is better, e.g., receive ratio) and
cost type (high value is worse, e.g., capture ratio, message latency, messages
sent). Decision Attributes can differ depending on the applications.
For a given network configuration NC and given protocol P , the result vector
rc,P can be determined experimentally (e.g., through simulations). The vector
contains the recorded (raw) values of all decision attributes.
rc,P = (rc,Pcr , r
c,P
rr , r
c,P
lat , r
c,P
mSent) (5.2)
Please note that, since the focus in this chapter has been for SLP-awareness,
the attributes of interest capture both the SLP level and WSNs performance
(e.g., capture ratio, receive ratio) and these are used in the vector. However, the
conjecture is that a similar heuristic can be used but for different objectives,
requiring a different set of attributes. An example of a result vector for an
arbitrary SLP-aware protocol P ′ for an input configuration NC′ , using the above
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attributes, could be:
rc
′,P ′ = (10%, 90%, 2500, 12800) (5.3)
However, these attributes do not satisfy the mutually preferentially indepen-
dent property. This is apparent as, for example, the capture ratio attribute is
dependent on the receive ratio attribute. For example, a low receive ratio will
imply a low capture ratio because the attacker will have overheard only a few
messages and would not have been able to track the asset down. In a similar
way, messages sent attribute is related to the receive ratio in that, if a node does
not receive a normal (data) message, then it is not going to forward it, reducing
the number of messages sent.
To address this issue, some of these attributes are opted to transform to
attempt to introduce the mutual preferential independence property. Since
receive ratio is the one attribute that seems to affect both capture ratio and
messages sent, these two attributes are normalised with respect to receive ratio,
i.e., these attributes are penalised with respect to the receive ratio. On the other
hand, message latency is independent of receive ratio. Thus, the attributes are
redefined as follows:
Rc,Pω =

rc,Pω /r
c,P
rr if ω ∈ {cr,mSent},
rc,Pω otherwise.
(5.4)
3. Determining Aspiration Vector
After a consideration of different scenarios, the aspiration value is chosen for each
attribute to remove any results not able to meet the scenario requirements. The
aspiration value defines the minimal (or maximal in the case of cost criterion)
acceptable value for each attribute. The aspiration vector is denoted by µa.
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4. Filtering the Protocols
Based on the performances of the various protocols, it is obvious that those
protocols that are worse (in all attributes) than all other protocols can be
removed from the list as it implies that such protocols will never get selected
when there is always another protocol that can deliver a better result. In this
case, based on the selection of protocols none of them is dominated and thus
none is removed from the list. For example, ILP Routing-Max has a very low
capture ratio but a very high latency as its mechanism is based on using time
redundancy to achieve privacy.
5. Checking Remaining Values
Each attribute needs to be checked whether any results are left in the scope of
the aspiration value. If not, the procedure returns to phase 3 and reselect the
aspiration value as all remaining results do not satisfy the aspiration value.
5.4.2 Step 2: Characterisation and Selection of SLP-Aware
Routing Algorithms
1. Determining Weights and Utility Functions
In the first phase of Step 2, individual weight λω (ω ∈ {cr, rr, lat,mSent}) is
chosen which represents the importance of attributes. From Step 1, the aspiration
vector is used to generate the utility function for each attribute. The total utility
obtained by a algorithm is shown below, where U c,Pω is single attribute utility
and Rc,Pω is a result value in R
c,P .
U c,P(λω, Rc,Pω ) =
∑
λω · U c,Pω (Rc,Pω ) (5.5)
2. Inserting Attribute Values
In the second phase of Step 2, each attribute uses the utility function and the
remaining normalised result vector (i.e., performance vector) in the library as
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input to calculate the utility value. Then the final utility of algorithm under NC
can be calculated by Equation 5.5.
3. Selecting Utility Value
After proceeding through the steps described above, the performance library has
obtained utility values for all algorithms and have chosen the best algorithm in
terms of the highest utility value. In this case, under network configuration NC
and the given scenario, the algorithm with the highest utility value has the best
performance.
5.5 Problem Statement
The problem in this chapter is the following: In a WSN, there is a bunch of
SLP-aware routing protocols can be used to deliver messages from the source
to the sink. An attacker exists initially located at the sink and starts receiving
messages sent by the source to the sink. Given a practical application, an
important problem is to choose the best performing routing protocol to meet
the requirements of the given application in terms of trade-offs. Formally, the
problem specification is shown in Figure 5.1.
5.6 An Example: Execution of Decision Theo-
retic Procedure
This section provides a brief example of the execution of the decision theoretic
procedures during the profiling and filtering phase (Subsection 5.4.1) and the
selection phase (Subsection 5.4.2).
Figure 5.2 is an example containing the results of the capture ratio, receive
ratio, message latency and messages sent for the various protocols under consid-
eration, with network configuration NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner, CasinoLab,
LowAsymmetry, 1.2) which specifies that the network is a grid network of 121
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Given:
• A WSN topology G = (V,E) where V is a set of wireless sensor nodes
and E is a set of edges or links,
• A set of SLP-aware routing protocols P,
• A distributed eavesdropper A that is located at the sink initially,
• A given practical application S,
• A set of network configurations C and
• A set of safety periods λ,
Objective:
• Choose the highest utility value of SLP-aware routing protocol from P
over λ in G, C, S and A.
Figure 5.1: Problem statement: Selection of the best performing SLP-aware
routing protocol under a practical application
nodes (i.e., 11×11), SourceCorner configuration (the source is at one corner of
the grid), casino-lab noise model, low asymmetry communication model and
1.2×T T safety period respectively. From Table 5.3, the safety period is 11.9
seconds. For simplicity, the overall utility of phantom routing is evaluated and
PW (1, 1) is for comparison under the such network configuration.
5.6.1 Step 1: Profiling and Filtering SLP-Aware Routing
Algorithms
This section now explains Step 1 of the decision theoretic procedure.
1. Profiling the Protocols
A number of routing protocols are executed, as explained in Section 5.2, some
SLP-aware and others not. Figure 5.2 shows the graphs of capture ratio, receive
ratio, message latency and messages sent.
Under configuration NC (as above), the result vector of phantom routing
is (0.25, 0.65, 0.05, 100), with 25% capture ratio, 65% receive ratio, 50 ms
for latency and 100 messages for messages sent. Similarly, the result vector of
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Figure 5.2: An Example: Protocols results of multiple attributes
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Figure 5.3: An Example: Multiple protocols results of normalised capture ratio
and messages sent
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PW (1, 1) is (0.1, 0.6, 0.06, 75). As discussed in section 5.4.1, results of attributes
in the vector are not mutually preferentially independent, so they need to be
normalised. The normalised results are shown in Figure 5.3. The normalised
result vector of phantom routing is calculated, which is (0.38, 0.65, 0.05, 153.85),
while the normalised result vector of PW (1, 1) is (0.17, 0.6, 0.06, 125). The
normalised result vectors are used, or performance vectors, to form the protocol
performance library, from which the most suitable SLP-aware routing protocol is
to be selected. Since the objective here is to show the execution of the decision
theoretic procedure, The example focuses on phantom routing and PW (1, 1).
2. Determining Relevant Attributes
The four attributes are: (i) capture ratio, (ii) receive ratio, (iii) message latency
and (iv) messages sent. In general, for SLP, capture ratio and message or energy
overhead are the two most important overheads. However, there are applications
when other parameters such as receive ratio is important. In this chapter, for
the applications, the above four attributes are considered relevant.
3. Determining Aspiration Vector
The aspiration value for each attribute needs to be determined. For instance, if
0.5 is given as an aspiration value for capture ratio and 60% for receive ratio,
the utility of capture ratio and receive ratio will be set to 0 at these values. The
system designer may consider that SLP cannot be provided if the capture ratio
is greater than 0.5 and that the routing protocol cannot work properly if the
receive ratio is lower than 60%. In this example, the aspiration vector is set to
(1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1000). This means that the normalised capture ratio is set to 1.0,
the receive ratio is set to 100%, latency is set to 1000 ms and the normalised
messages sent are set to 1000.
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4. Filtering the Protocols
Having the normalised results of both phantom routing and PW (1, 1), the results
first need to be determined whether these two results are dominated by each
other. If one protocol dominates the other, then there is a clear winner and
the dominating protocol is selected as the best one. From the performance
library, only the capture ratio and messages sent of PW (1, 1) performs better
than phantom routing. Hence, PW (1, 1) does not dominate phantom routing
and vice-versa. Therefore, in this case, both results are retained for further
consideration.
5. Checking Remaining Values
Since neither PW (1, 1) nor phantom routing dominate each other, there is a need
to determine whether they are dominated by the aspiration vector. The aspiration
vector is (1.0, 1.0, 0.1, 1000) while the performance profiles of phantom routing
and PW (1, 1) are (0.38, 0.65, 0.05, 153.85) and (0.17, 0.6, 0.06, 125) respectively.
As can be observed, the aspiration vector does not dominate either of the
protocols, hence both protocols are still under consideration.
5.6.2 Step 2: Characterisation and Selection of SLP-Aware
Routing Algorithms
Since there is more than a single protocol still in contention (i.e., there is no
clear winner), step 2 is detailed in this section to select the better protocol.
1. Determining Weights and Utility Functions
Based on the aspiration vector, the sigmoid functions are used to build the utility
functions for attributes1. Assuming in a scenario, all attributes are sensitive.
For example, the utility keeps in a high value when capture ratio is below 0.2.
However, the utility decrease quickly when capture ratio is larger than 0.2. In a
1Other utility functions could be also applied and they will be shown in Section 5.8.
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similar way, the message latency is intolerant when it is longer than 1 second.
Therefore, the parameters are chosen and generate the utility functions for the
four attributes, as shown in Equation 5.6 to Equation 5.9. These four sigmoid
functions are shown in Figure 5.4 respectively. For simplicity, a weight vector
is adopted with equal values λ = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25), meaning that all four
attributes are equally as important.
UNC,Pcr (R
NC,P
cr ) =
1
1 + e10(R
NC,P
cr −0.5)
(5.6)
UNC,Prr (R
NC,P
rr ) =
1
1 + e10(−R
NC,P
rr +0.5)
(5.7)
UNC,Plat (R
NC,P
lat ) =
1
1 + e10(R
NC,P
lat −0.5)
(5.8)
UNC,PmSent(R
NC,P
mSent) =
1
1 + e0.01(R
NC,P
mSent−500)
(5.9)
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Figure 5.4: Illustration of the utility functions in the example
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2. Inserting Attribute Values
Using the utility functions previously identified (Equation 5.6 to Equation 5.9),
the utility value of each attribute can be calculated in phantom routing: UNC,Pcr (0.38) =
0.77, UNC,Prr (0.65) = 0.82, U
NC,P
lat (0.05) = 0.99 and U
NC,P
mSent(153.85) = 0.97. Fi-
nally, using the identified weight vector λ, the final utility of protocol P phantom
routing under NC is:
UNC,P(λω, RNC,Pω ) =
∑
λω · UNC,Pω (RNC,Pω )
= 0.25× 0.77 + 0.25× 0.82 + 0.25× 0.99 + 0.25× 0.97
= 0.89
(5.10)
Similarly, the utility value of PW (1, 1) also can be calculated: UNC,Pcr (0.17) =
0.96, UNC,Prr (0.6) = 0.73, U
NC,P
lat (0.06) = 0.99 and U
NC,P
mSent(125) = 0.98. The
final utility is 0.92.
3. Selecting Utility Value
Comparing the final utility of phantom routing and PW (1, 1), PW (1, 1) is
selected as the better algorithm to provide SLP under a network configuration
NC and with weight λ, as it is the one with the highest utility value.
5.7 Experimental Setup
A square grid network layout of size n × n was used in all experiments, with
n ∈ {11, 21}, i.e., networks with 121 and 441 nodes respectively. The source
period was set to 1 second. Node neighbourhoods were generated using low-
asymmetry, which uses the LinkLayerModel tool provided with TOSSIM to
generate link strengths between nodes using the parameters shown in Table 5.4.
Links generated with low-asymmetry have a small probability of becoming
asynchronous. Studies have shown that unreliable and asymmetric links can
have a major impact on the performance of protocols [153].
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The safety periods are calculated with different safety factors varying from
0.4, 0.8, 1.2 until 2.8 from Equation 3.1. The time taken for each network size
and network configuration, for protectionless flooding is shown in table Table 5.2
and Table 5.3.
Network casino-lab casino-lab meyer-heavy meyer-heavy
Size ideal low-asymmetry ideal low-asymmetry
11 × 11 12.355 ± 2.333 9.613 ± 2.231 12.479 ± 2.440 16.703 ± 6.578
21 × 21 25.059 ± 3.743 19.838 ± 3.597 25.617 ± 4.102 36.222 ± 10.994
Table 5.2: Time taken (seconds) of flooding for SinkCorner configuration with
various models
Network casino-lab casino-lab meyer-heavy meyer-heavy
Size ideal low-asymmetry ideal low-asymmetry
11 × 11 12.732 ± 2.736 9.928 ± 3.424 12.826 ± 2.660 22.890 ± 12.792
21 × 21 25.727 ± 4.111 20.405 ± 5.018 25.813 ± 4.169 46.836 ± 17.429
Table 5.3: Time taken (seconds) of flooding for SourceCorner configuration with
various models
Phantom Routing and Phantom Walkabouts
These two algorithms both rely on the random walk technique. When choos-
ing the length of the short and long random walks, a variety of parameter
combinations were considered. The experiments set the short random walk
series S = {2, 3, . . . , 0.5×∆ss}, and long random walk series L = {2 + ∆ss, 3 +
∆ss, . . . , 1.5×∆ss}, where ∆ss is the sink-source distance. In phantom walka-
bouts, short and long random walk lengths are randomly generated from S and
L respectively. For phantom routing, the random walk length is 0.5×∆ss hops.
DynamicSPR
For this technique, as it aims to dynamically determine the parameters to
use online, there are few parameters to specify. Other than the previously
mentioned parameters, only the approach used needs to be specified. The
approach determines how many fake messages are sent over the lifetime of
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Name Value
PATH LOSS EXPONENT 4.7
SHADOWING STANDARD DEVIATION 3.2
D0 1.0
PL D0 55.4
NOISE FLOOR -105
S [0.9 -0.7; -0.7 1.2]
WHITE GAUSSIAN NOISE 4
Table 5.4: LinkLayer model parameters for the low-asymmetry radio model
a temporary fake source. There are three options: Fixed1, Fixed2 and Rnd.
Fixed1 sends a single fake message over the duration, Fixed2 sends two fake
messages over the duration and Rnd sends either 1 or 2 messages randomly
chosen.
ILP Routing
This algorithm has four parameters: maximum walk length, buffer size, the
number of messages to group and the probability that the message is sent directly
to the sink. The same parameters are used in [15]. As the maximum walk length
is simply to provide a finite bound in large networks, it was set to 100 hops. The
number of messages to group was varied between {1, 2, 3, 4}. The buffer size
was set to 10 messages as no more than 10 concurrent messages are expected
being sent in the network at one time. Finally, the probability of sending a
message directly to the sink was set to 20% as it was identified as a good setting
in [15].
5.8 Case Studies: Routing Protocol Selection
for Different Application Scenarios
This section will develop three case studies to showcase both the applicability of,
and the generality allowed by, the methodology. The three case studies are: (i)
an animal protection scenario, (ii) a non-critical asset monitoring scenario and
(iii) a security-critical military scenario.
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The first phase reuses the library that has already been built, consisting of a
number of protocols that have been profiled. The library is denoted by L and the
protocols used are listed in Table 5.5. Next, the set of decision attributes contain
(i) capture ratio, (ii) receive ratio, (iii) message latency and (iv) messages sent.
In the next step, rather than deciding on the input network configuration, the
section will eschew this step so as to keep the discussion as general as possible.
This section also has the following aspiration performance vector:
µa = (min{Rc,Pcr | P ∈ L},max{Rc,Prr | P ∈ L},min{Rc,Plat | P ∈ L},min{Rc,PmSent | P ∈ L})
(5.11)
Thus, this means that all protocols are in contention and will be under
consideration, i.e., there is no protocol filtering at this time.
The first phase of Step 2 is to decide the importance of each of the attributes
(from capture ratio, receive ratio, message latency and messages sent) and to
create a vector of weights quantifying the preference of each metric. Utilising
the data and methods presented in Subsection 5.4.1, it is possible to calculate
the utility of each protocol-parameter combination and generate plots to show
which combination provides the highest utility for the given scenario. Specifically,
using input network configuration NC, it is possible to then select the most
appropriate protocol.
For attributes, both non-linear2 and linear functions3 are used to model
the utility of each parameter, as shown in Table 5.6. The reason why these
functions is: The choices would like to show that the framework works with the
combination of linear and non-linear functions. For those important attributes,
non-linear functions are used to satisfy the quick change rate of the utility while
linear functions are used for a smooth change rate. Parameters for the different
attribute utility functions in different scenarios are shown in Table 5.7.
For all case studies, the network is assumed to be a grid with SourceCorner
2The sigmoid function f(x) = 1
1+ek(−x−x0)
is used as the utility function for receive ratio,
and g(x) = 1
1+ek(x−x0)
for the rest attributes.
3The utility function is f(x) = kx + x0
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and SinkCorner configurations. Note that these assumptions need not be the
case and there is no constraint imposed by the approach that precludes certain
types of networks.
Algorithm Name Technique SLP-aware?
Protectionless Flooding No
Protectionless CTP Collection Tree Protocol No
DynamicSPR Fake Messages Yes
ILP Routing Directed Walk Yes
Phantom Routing Directed Random Walk Yes
Phantom Walkabouts Directed Random Walk Yes
Table 5.5: Protocols library (L)
Attribute
Function Model Types
Animal Protection Asset Monitor Military
Normalised Capture Ratio Non-Linear Linear Non-Linear
Receive Ratio (%) Linear Non-Linear Non-Linear
Message Latency (seconds) Linear Linear Non-Linear
Normalised Messages Sent Linear Non-Linear Linear
Table 5.6: Model types of attribute utility funtions
Attribute
Scenario
Animal Protection Asset Monitoring Military
k x0 weight k x0 weight k x0 weight
Normalised Capture Ratio 50.0 0.1 0.4 -1.0 1.0 0.2 50.0 0.1 0.4
Receive Ratio (%) 1.0 0.0 0.2 20.0 -0.8 0.4 20.0 -0.8 0.25
Message Latency (seconds) -0.5 1.0 0.2 -0.5 1.0 0.1 10.0 0.5 0.25
Normalised Messages Sent -0.0005 1.0 0.2 0.01 400 0.3 -0.0005 1.0 0.1
Table 5.7: Parameters for attribute utility functions in different scenarios
5.8.1 Animal Protection Scenario
In this scenario, to prevent the rare animal from being captured by a poacher,
SLP is crucial. Badger protection [41] and the WWF’s Wildlife Crime Technology
Report [1] are real world examples of animal protection. Therefore, capture ratio
is the most important attribute animal protection. To maximise network lifetime,
the message overhead needs to be reduced while receive ratio needs to be high
as well to better understand the animal’s behaviour. Thus, the weighting vector
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is set to be λ = (0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2). These weights and respective utility values
(see Tables 5.6 and 5.7 for each attribute) are used to produce overall utility
plots, allowing us to deliberate which protocol and parameter combination would
be most suited for the application. Figure 5.5 shows the overall utility values
generated using the weights and utility functions previously specified4.
Protocol Selection
An input network configuration is required from the utility values. For example,
if the animal is expected to trigger a node that is at the top-left corner of a grid
network of 11×11 that has been deployed and that the animal is expected to be
constantly on the move (i.e., spending only a short time at a given location), and
the environment is expected to be lightly noisy (similar to the casino-lab noise
model) and the links are expected to be often unidirectional, then the input
configuration can be settled with LowAsymmetry communication model. For
instance, the configuration may be as follows: NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner,
CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2). Thus, the protocol performance is discussed
under the SourceCorner and SinkCorner configuration.
• SourceCorner Configuration: The configuration NC = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2) will correspond to Figure 5.5c
and the best protocol is AdaptiveSPR because AdaptiveSPR-Min and
AdaptiveSPR-max provide near-comparable performance. On the other
hand, for example, if the input configuration isNC = (grid, 441, SourceCorner,
CasinoLab, Ideal, 1.2), then the protocols that achieve the best trade-offs
are PW (1, 1) and PW (1, 2) (see Figure 5.5b).
• SinkCorner Configuration: Differing from results in SourceCorner
configuration, the best protocol is ILP Routing with configuration NC =
(grid, 121, SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2) (see Figure 5.6c).
Similarly, ILP Routing also dominates other routing protocols with the
4For simplicity, each configuration was described under corresponding graph with such
format: number of nodes/noise model/communication model.
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input configuration NC = (grid, 441, SourceCorner, CasinoLab, Ideal,
1.2)(see Figure 5.6b).
5.8.2 Asset Monitoring Scenario
Sensors are often deployed in the body of bridges or in a building to monitor
product quality [5]. They can also be deployed to monitor and understand animal
behaviour (e.g., Great Duck Island [101]), differently from animal protection,
as explained in the previous section. For this type of application, it could be
assumed that receive ratio is the most important factor. This would leave capture
ratio, latency and messages sent to be less important. Assume the weighting
vector λ = (0.2, 0.4, 0.1, 0.3) respectively representing capture ratio, receive ratio,
latency and messages sent.
Protocol Selection
From the utility values, the input network configuration is required. For example,
if the animal is expected to trigger a node that is at the top-left corner of a grid
network of 11×11 that has been deployed. Since the animal is not expected to be
very mobile and the environment can be expected to be noisy (i.e., similar to the
meyer-heavy noise model) with unidirectional links due to a lack of line-of-sight
transmission, then the input configuration can be as follows: NC = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 2).
On the other hand, if the environment is not very noisy, i.e., similar to the
casino-lab noise model, the network configuration would be NC = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 2).
• SourceCorner Configuration: When NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner,
MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 2), this configuration will correspond to
the Figure 5.7g and the best protocol is Protectionless CTP. The reasons
why a non-SLP routing protocol is selected are (i) the Protectionless CTP
has the highest utility and (ii) the SLP is not the most important attribute
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Figure 5.5: Utility of animal protection scenario in SourceCorner configuration
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Figure 5.6: Utility of animal protection scenario in SinkCorner configuration
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in this scenario. If the environment is not noisy, with NC = (grid, 121,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 2), ILP Routing is the protocol
that achieves the best trade-off (Figure 5.7c).
• SinkCorner Configuration: When NC = (grid, 121, SinkCorner, Mey-
erHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 2), as the same as the results in SourceCorner
configuration, protectionless CTP is the best protocol (Figure 5.8g). Adap-
tiveSPR has the best performance under NC = (grid, 121, SinkCorner,
CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 2)(Figure 5.8c).
5.8.3 Military Scenario
The use of sensor networks in military situations includes communication, battle-
field surveillance and battle damage assessment among many others [5]. When
these activities are carried out by military personnel, then SLP is extremely
important. Furthermore, these networks may be short-lived, thus message over-
head is not very important. On the other hand, latency and receive ratio are
important, though less than SLP, to ensure soldiers can communicate in near
real-time. Thus, the weight vector is λ = (0.4, 0.25, 0.25, 0.1).
Protocol Selection
From the utility values, the input network configuration is required. For example,
the surveillance activity to be carried out is expected to trigger a node that is at
the top-left corner of a grid network of 11×11 that has been deployed. Since the
personnel are expected to be very mobile and the environment can be expected
to be noisy (i.e., similar to the MeyerHeavy noise model) with unidirectional
links due to a lack of line-of-sight transmission, then the input configuration can
be as follows: NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner, MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry,
1.2). On the other hand, if the environment is not very noisy, i.e., similar to
the casino-lab noise model, the network configuration would be NC = (grid,441,
SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2).
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Figure 5.7: Utility of asset monitoring scenario in SourceCorner configuration
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Figure 5.8: Utility of asset monitoring scenario in SinkCorner configuration
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• SourceCorner Configuration: When NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner,
MeyerHeavy, LowAsymmetry, 1.2), this configuration will correspond
to Figure 5.9g and the best protocol is AdaptiveSPR. AdaptiveSPR is also
the protocol that achieves the best trade-off in Figure 5.9d with a network
configuration NC = (grid,441, SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry,
1.2). In the ideal environment, apart from ILP Routing, other protocols
are good choices. However, when the environment gets worse (e.g., links
are not reliable between two nodes), Protectionless and Protectionless CTP
generally become the protocols of choice.
• SinkCorner Configuration: There are several protocols that achieve
same best performance when NC = (grid, 121, SourceCorner, Meyer-
Heavy, LowAsymmetry, 1.2): phantom routing, PW(1,1) and PW(1,2)(see
Figure 5.10g). These two protocols also have the best performance with NC
= (grid,441, SourceCorner, CasinoLab, LowAsymmetry, 1.2)(Figure 5.10d).
5.9 Summary
Source location privacy (SLP) is becoming an important property for a large
class of security-critical wireless sensor network applications such as monitoring
and tracking. Many routing protocols have been proposed that provide SLP, all
of which provide a trade-off between SLP and energy. Experiments have been
conducted to gauge the performance of the proposed protocols under different
network parameters such as noise levels. As there exists a plethora of protocols
which contain a set of possibly conflicting performance attributes, it is difficult
to select the SLP protocol that will provide the best trade-offs across them for a
given application with specific requirements.
This chapter investigates the performance of SLP-aware routing protocols in
wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The chapter especially focuses on the selection
between SLP-aware routing protocols that achieves the best trade-offs among
a set of attributes in the different scenarios. The methodology is based on the
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Figure 5.9: Utility of military scenario in SourceCorner configuration
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Figure 5.10: Utility of military scenario in SinkCorner configuration
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existence of a library of performance profiles of various routing algorithms and
the decision theoretic procedure allows trade-offs to be assessed. This can be
achieved when the attributes are mutually preferentially independent. Utility
functions, weights of the attributes and network configurations are inputs that
have to be provided by network administrators.
The main contribution is developing a decision theoretical framework that
enables the the selection of the best performing SLP-aware protocols for the
task. The framework has two steps: protocols profiling and protocol selection.
The protocol selection step is based on a decision theoretic procedure that
first removes dominated protocols and then formalises the notion of relevance
using suitable utility functions. Furthermore, three different case studies are
proposed to showcase the viability of the approach. The framework is not only
applicable to the protocols in this chapter, but can be extended to handle any
other SLP-aware routing protocols.
In future work, there are a few additions need to be done. First, the research
will focus on generating profiles for other network configuration where both the
source and sink are located in the opposite corners (called FurtherSinkCorner) in
the network. Second, other protocols will be considered, such as OLSR [66], for
protectionless routing to provide a baseline profile. And finally, further research
plans on investigating the suitability of preference learning [47] for selecting
appropriate values for aspiration levels.
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Conclusions and Further Work
The work described in this thesis has been concerned with SLP-aware routing
protocols under practical scenarios in wireless sensor networks (WSNs). As
wireless sensor networks have been applied across a spectrum of application
domains such as asset monitoring, there is a need to consider security and
privacy issues. One such issue is that of source location privacy (SLP) where the
location of the source in the network needs to be kept secret from a malicious
adversary. Several techniques have been proposed to provide SLP against an
eavesdropping attacker, whereas results presented in support of these protocols
have not included considerations for practical scenarios, omitting simulations
and analyses with various network configurations. This thesis investigates SLP-
aware routing protocols under practical scenarios in terms of routing protocols,
parameterisations and trade-offs in WSNs.
The thesis first evaluates phantom routing by conducting an in-depth investi-
gation of multiple attributes under various network configurations. The results
demonstrate that previous work in phantom routing does not generalise well to
different network configurations such as multiple sources. In order to address
some weaknesses of phantom routing, phantom walkabouts is proposed, a novel
and more general version of phantom routing, which performs phantom routes
of variable lengths. Results from extensive simulations indicate a high level
of SLP is achievable as a trade-off for a decrease in other attributes (e.g., the
receive ratio). Finally the thesis proposes a decision theoretic procedure used
to select SLP-aware routing protocols that achieve the best trade-offs among
a set of attributes, which addresses the existing difficulty of selecting a SLP
protocol that will provide the best trade-offs for a given application with specific
141
6. Conclusions and Further Work
requirements.
The key contributions of this thesis are summarised in the first three sections
of this chapter. Further works are then presented in Section 6.4.
6.1 Assessing the Performance of Phantom Rout-
ing on Source Location Privacy under Prac-
tical Scenarios
As WSNs have been applied across a spectrum of application domains, source
location privacy (SLP) has emerged as a significant issue, particularly in safety-
critical situations. In seminal work on SLP, phantom routing was proposed as
an approach to address this problem. However, results presented in support
of phantom routing have not included considerations for practical network
configurations, and have omitted simulations and analyses with multiple sources.
Chapter 3 investigates the performance of phantom routing, a well-known
algorithm that provides SLP in the WSN, under various network scenarios.
Four application parameters are considered: (i) length of the random walk,
(ii) source period, (iii) network size and (iv) number of sources. Meanwhile,
various attributes related to the simulations are comprehensively discussed. The
results show that (i) an increase in the length of the random walk leads to a
corresponding increase in SLP level, (ii) a decrease of source period causes a
decrease in the SLP level provided (i.e., the capture ratio increases), (iii) the SLP
level does not change in response to changing network sizes, (iv) the increasing
number of sources also causes an increase of capture ratio and (v) the receive
ratio affects the performance of SLP level. The conclusion is that phantom
routing is not as effective as initially claimed, as it was previously evaluated
under a restricted set of circumstances and network configurations, e.g., one
single source.
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6.2 Developing Phantom Walkabouts to Achieve
High Level of SLP
In seminal work on SLP, phantom routing was proposed as a viable approach to
address SLP. However, the work has shown the limitations of phantom routing
such as poor performance with multiple sources. Therefore, there is a need to
develop a new routing protocol to perform better SLP than phantom routing
can achieve.
In Chapter 4, the research starts with review of phantom routing, and then
propose a novel technique called phantom walkabouts, which extends phantom
routing to provide a better SLP level. Phantom walkabouts interleaves sequences
of short random walks and long random walks to make the attacker move in
the wrong direction, as opposed to phantom routing (with small random walks)
where the attacker moves towards the source, hence improving the SLP level.
A large-scale experiments are conducted to evaluate the efficiency of phantom
walkabouts. The results have shown that phantom walkabouts provides much
better level of SLP with multiple sources at certain parametrisation at the
expense of energy and/or data yield. For some applications receive ratio and
latency of this magnitude will be acceptable. For example, in a panda protection
scenario the receive ratio will not be adversely affected.
6.3 A Decision Theoretic Framework for Select-
ing SLP-Aware Routing Protocols
Many routing protocols have been proposed that provide SLP, all of which
provide a trade-off between SLP and energy. Experiments have been conducted
to gauge the performance of the proposed protocols under different network
parameters such as noise levels. As there exists a plethora of protocols which
contain a set of possibly conflicting performance attributes, it is difficult to select
the SLP protocol that will provide the best trade-offs across them for a given
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application with specific requirements.
A decision theoretic procedure is proposed in Chapter 5 for selecting the SLP-
aware routing algorithm that achieves the best trade-offs among a set of attributes.
A methodology is proposed where routing protocols are first profiled to capture
their performance under various protocol configurations. Then, a novel decision
theoretic procedure is presented for selecting the most appropriate SLP routing
algorithm for the application and network under investigation. The methodology
is based on the existence of a library of performance profiles of various routing
algorithms. The decision theoretic procedure allows trade-offs to be assessed.
This can be achieved when attributes are mutually preferentially independent.
Utility functions, weights of the attributes and network configurations are inputs
that have to be provided by network administrators. The results have presented
three case studies to showcase the viability of the approach.
6.4 Directions for Further Work
Following on from the work presented in this thesis, some more general directions
are outlined for the work in the future.
Generic network configurations in wireless sensor networks
This thesis adopts a grid network configuration where nodes are evenly deployed
in the network, but irregularly shaped networks should be considered. The
network should be modelled under more realistic conditions where nodes are
randomly deployed in the network, so that there are not always four neighbours
for each node. In addition, results from simulations using TOSSIM do not
work on real sensor devices, which limits practical analysis. Instead, it would
be beneficial working on the SLP problem through testbeds that are deployed
with real sensor network devices in the network. For instance, MoteLab [142]
addresses this need allowing users to access and schedule experiments on real
hardware via a web interface.
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Developing dynamic protocols to address SLP
The phantom walkabouts technique presented in Chapter 4 uses fixed values
to solve the SLP issue. For instance, the experiments used a given value for
short random walks and a different value for long random walks (i.e., m and
n are fixed in PW (m,n)). However, this need not be the case. The main
weakness of phantom walkabouts is that it is not generically applicable to any
network configuration. One further plan is to investigate phantom walkabouts
with variable short and long random walks where parameters are decided in the
runtime rather than in the compile time of the firmware. The conjecture would
be that better trade-offs can be achieved by varying the length of short and long
random walks. Besides, another research plan is to investigate, as mentioned
in Chapter 4, the influence of other network configurations (e.g., the non-grid
network configuration).
Developing a dynamic decision theoretic framework for SLP-aware
routing protocol selection
The one drawback of the framework introduced in Chapter 5 is that most of the
parameters must be provided manually by the network administrator. Namely,
they must supply the network configuration, definitions of aspiration levels for the
criteria, and the criteria as well. In practice, it may be hard for an administrator
to determine if, for example, 20 milliseconds of latency is acceptable while 19
milliseconds is not. It would be worth considering an application of preference
learning methodology [47] to help the administrator in selecting the appropriate
values of aspiration levels. Other protocols will be also considered, such as
OLSR [66], for protectionless routing to provide a baseline profile.
Mobile nodes in the wireless sensor networks
So far, solutions of location privacy have considered the static network, i.e.,
nodes are stationary in the network. However, considering the mobile nodes
such as the mobile source or mobile sink would be a challenging task from the
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perspective of location privacy. Undoubtedly, the new system model, threat
model and theory need to be redefined to handle the emerging issue. Phantom
walkabouts also needs a redesign. For example, when a node senses the change
of environment, it can randomly move towards the sink instead of relying on
multiple-hop communication. Another possible improvement is the sink can
move to the direction of the incoming message with the long random walk.
Because in some network configuration (e.g., SourceCorner configuration) the
last node in the long random walk routing path is far away from the source.
Furthermore, introducing mobile nodes is consistent with the scenarios of the
Internet of Things (IoT), where embedded devices with sensors are attached to
everyday objects even people. In this case, solving the privacy in this situation
may be regarded as solutions of location privacy in IoT.
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APPENDIX A
Result Reproduction
The results presented in this thesis were obtained with reproducibility in mind.
All results obtained from simulations TOSSIM are deterministic for a given
random seed. As part of this work a simulation framework used to run simulations,
gather results, and analyse them was developed. The source codes for this
framework can be found at (1) and the main development repository for TinyOS
can be found at (2).
1. https://bitbucket.org/Chen_Gu/slp-algorithms-tinyos
2. https://github.com/MBradbury/tinyos-main
The raw results generated by TOSSIM can be found at the following location:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.1323732
This results include all TOSSIM results presented in Chapter 3, Chapter 4
and Chapter 5, and the directory tree of the results is shown in Appendix A.1.
Thesis Dataset ChenGu
protectionless Dataset
Chapter3 Dataset
Chapter4 Dataset
Chapter5 Dataset
adaptive spr notify chen
phantom chen
protectionless chen
ilprouting chen
phantom walkabouts
protectionless ctp chen
Figure A.1: The directory tree of the results file
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APPENDIX B
Results of Sink-Source Distance
In the thesis, the network is modelled as a graph G = (V,E) where V is the set
of nodes and E is the set of links. An link is a 2-tuple (u, v) where u is the origin
and v is the target. Each node in V is assigned a 2D coordinate and the distance
is calculated as one hop between each node. The reason why hops are used as
the distance between nodes is that an adversary traces back to the source by
following these links. The hop distance is used in many places in the thesis. For
example, nodes know 1-hop neighbours (i.e., the communication range of nodes
is 1 hop); The attacker can sense all the communications within 1 hop distance;
In the phantom routing and phantom walkabouts, the landmark node floods
away and beacon messages to the normal nodes and notify them the distance
between sink and themselves.
The distance between the sink and the source is important since the message
is sent from the source to the sink. The sink-source distance is used to divide the
source’s neighbours into different sets. The sink-source distance varies depending
on the network configurations and network sizes. Given a configuration and
a network size, the sink-source distance presents the minimum hops that an
adversary can travel back from the sink to the source. The sink-source distances
used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are shown in Table B.1, Table B.2 and Table B.3,
and the results in Table B.4, Table B.5 and Table B.6 are used in Chapter 5.
The results show that the sink-source distance varies under different models and
network sizes1.
1All the results are generated from 10000 repeats of protectionless flooding.
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Results of Sink-Source Distance
Network Size SinkCorner (1 source) SourceCorner (1 source)
11× 11 10.3 ± 0.2 10.3 ± 0.2
15× 15 14.1 ± 0.1 14.3 ± 0.2
21× 21 20.1 ± 0.1 20.4 ± 0.2
25× 25 24.2 ± 0.1 24.4 ± 0.2
Table B.1: The sink-source distance (hops) under the meyer-heavy communica-
tion model and ideal noise model with 1 source
Network Size SinkCorner (2 sources) SourceCorner (2 sources)
11× 11 10.1 ± 0.2 9.3 ± 0.3
15× 15 14.2 ± 0.2 13.4 ± 0.2
21× 21 20.2 ± 0.2 19.4 ± 0.2
25× 25 24.2 ± 0.2 23.4 ± 0.2
Table B.2: The sink-source distance (hops) under the meyer-heavy communica-
tion model and ideal noise model with 2 sources
Network Size SinkCorner (3 sources) SourceCorner (3 sources)
11× 11 9.9 ± 0.4 9.0 ± 0.3
15× 15 14.0 ± 0.3 13.0 ± 0.3
21× 21 20.0 ± 0.3 19.1 ± 0.2
25× 25 24.0 ± 0.3 23.1 ± 0.2
Table B.3: The sink-source distance (hops) under the meyer-heavy communica-
tion model and ideal noise model with 3 sources
Network Size SinkCorner (1 source) SourceCorner (1 source)
11× 11 10.1 ± 0.1 10.3 ± 0.2
15× 15 14.1 ± 0.1 14.3 ± 0.2
21× 21 20.1 ± 0.1 20.3 ± 0.2
25× 25 24.2 ± 0.1 24.4 ± 0.2
Table B.4: The sink-source distance (hops) under the casino-lab communication
model and ideal noise model with 1 source
Network Size SinkCorner (1 source) SourceCorner (1 source)
11× 11 7.7 ± 0.6 7.9 ± 0.7
15× 15 10.8 ± 0.7 10.9 ± 0.7
21× 21 15.3 ± 0.7 15.4 ± 0.7
25× 25 18.3 ± 0.7 18.4 ± 0.7
Table B.5: The sink-source distance (hops) under the casino-lab communication
model and low-asymmetry noise model with 1 source
Network Size SinkCorner (1 source) SourceCorner (1 source)
11× 11 9.3 ± 0.9 9.7 ± 0.9
15× 15 12.8 ± 0.8 13.2 ± 0.8
21× 21 17.9 ± 0.8 18.4 ± 0.8
25× 25 21.4 ± 0.8 21.8 ± 0.8
Table B.6: The sink-source distance (hops) under the meyer-heavy communica-
tion model and low-asymmetry noise model with 1 source
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